Disorganized crime : the economics of the visible hand
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Disorganized crime : the economics of the visible hand
MIT Press, 1984, c1983
- : pbk
Available at 36 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
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  Fukushima
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  Tochigi
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  Toyama
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  Hiroshima
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  Tokushima
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  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
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  Okinawa
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Note
Bibliography: p. [222]-228
Includes index
Description and Table of Contents
- Volume
-
ISBN 9780262181075
Description
Winner of the 9984 Leslie T. Wilkins Award for the best book in criminology and criminal justice.
- Volume
-
: pbk ISBN 9780262680486
Description
" Winner of the 9984 Leslie T. Wilkins Award for the best book in criminology and criminal justice."Bookmaking, numbers, and loansharking are reputed to be major sources of revenue for organized crime, controlled by the "visible hand" of violence. For years this belief has formed the basis of government policy toward illegal markets. Drawing on police files, confiscated records, and interviews with police, prosecutors, and criminal informants, Reuter systematically refutes the notion that the Mafia, by using political connections and the threat of violence, controls the major illegal markets. Instead, he suggests that the cost of suppressing competition has ensured that these markets are populated with small enterprises, many of them marginal and ephemeral.Peter Reuter is a Senior Economist at the Rand Corporation. "Disorganized Crime" is included in The MIT Press Series on Organization Studies, edited by John Van Maanen.
by "Nielsen BookData"