Game theoretic analysis of voting in committees
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Game theoretic analysis of voting in committees
(Econometric Society monographs in pure theory)(Publication / Econometric Society, no. 7)
Cambridge University Press, 1984
- : pbk
Available at 48 libraries
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Note
Bibliography: p. 163-166
Includes indexes
Description and Table of Contents
Description
This book is a theoretical and completely rigorous analysis of voting in committees that provides mathematical proof of the existence of democratic voting systems, which are immune to the manipulation of preferences of coalitions of voters. The author begins by determining the power distribution among voters that is induced by a voting rule, giving particular consideration to choice by plurality voting and Borda's rule. He then constructs, for all possible committees, well-behaved representative voting procedures which are not distorted by strategic voting, giving complete solutions for certain important classes of committees. The solution to the problem of mass elections is fully characterised.
Table of Contents
- 1. Introduction and Summary of the Main Results
- 2. Preliminary Concepts and Basic Results
- 3. Representations of Committees
- 4. Strong and Dynamic Representations
- 5. Exactly and Strongly Consistent Anonymous Social Choice Functions
- 6. Effectivity Functions and Implementation
- 7. Concluding Remarks.
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