The army and Vietnam
著者
書誌事項
The army and Vietnam
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986
大学図書館所蔵 全16件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
  茨城
  栃木
  群馬
  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
  ベルギー
  オランダ
  スウェーデン
  ノルウェー
  アメリカ
注記
Includes index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Many senior army officials still claim that if they had been given enough soldiers and weapons, the United States could have won the war in Vietnam. In this probing analysis of U.S. military policy in Vietnam, career army officer and strategist Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., argues that precisely because of this mindset the war was lost before it was fought.
The army assumed that it could transplant to Indochina the operational methods that had been successful in the European battle theaters of World War II, an approach that proved ill-suited to the way the Vietnamese Communist forces fought. Theirs was a war of insurgency, and counterinsurgency, Krepinevich contends, requires light infantry formations, firepower restraint, and the resolution of political and social problems within the nation. To the very end, top military commanders refused to recognize this.
Krepinevich documents the deep division not only between the American military and civilian leaders over the very nature of the war, but also within the U.S. Army itself. Through extensive research in declassified material and interviews with officers and men with battlefield experience, he shows that those engaged in the combat understood early on that they were involved in a different kind of conflict. Their reports and urgings were discounted by the generals, who pressed on with a conventional war that brought devastation but little success.
A thorough analysis of the U.S. Army's role in the Vietnam War, The Army and Vietnam demonstrates with chilling persuasiveness the ways in which the army was unprepared to fight-lessons applicable to today's wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
目次
List of Illustrations
Foreword
Acknowledgments
Abbreviations and Acronyms
Part I: The Advisory Years, 1954-1965
Chapter 1. Brushfires on a Cold Dawn
Chapter 2. The Revolution That Failed
Chapter 3. Into the Quagmire
Chapter 4. Gearing Up For Counterinsurgency
Part II: Years of Intervention, 1965-1968
Chapter 5. Forty-four Battalions Across the Rubicon
Chapter 6. A Strategy of Tactics
Chapter 7. Counterinsurgency American-Style
Chapter 8. The "Other" War
Part III: Years of Withdrawal, 1968-1973
Chapter 9. Let: Defeat in Victory
Chapter 10. Paths Untaken, Paths Forsaken
Notes
Index
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