Congressmen, constituents, and contributors : determinants of roll call voting in the House of Representatives
著者
書誌事項
Congressmen, constituents, and contributors : determinants of roll call voting in the House of Representatives
(Studies in public choice / series editor, Randall G. Holcombe ; founding editor, Gordon Tullock, 4)
M. Nijhoff, c1982
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注記
Bibliography: p. 145-150
Includes index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
In a sense, this book might seem like a strange undertaking for two economists. The material seems to be much closer to political science than to economics; our topic is the determinants of congressional voting. Legislatures and roll call voting are traditionally in the domain of political science. This introduction is intended to explain why we have found this book worth writing. Today the economy functions in a regulated framework. Whether or not there ever was a "golden age" of laissez faire capitalism is an issue for historians; such an age does not now exist. One implication of the high degree of politicization of the modern economy is that one cannot any longer study economics divorced from politics. The rise to prominence of the field of public choice is one strong piece of evidence about what many economists see as the significant influence of the political sector over what would seem to be purely economic variables. A more homey example may also be used to il lustrate the phenomenon of increased politicization of the economy. All economists have had the experience of lecturing on the unemployment creating effects of a minimum wage or on the shortage-creating implications of price controls, only to have a student ask: "But if that is so, why do we have those laws?" One way of viewing this book is as an attempt to answer that question.
目次
I Theory.- 1 The Problem: Economic Analysis and the Rise of New Regulation.- 2 Ideology: An Explanation for Public Policy Making.- 3 Roll Call Voting by Congress.- II Evidence.- 4 Public Interest Lobbies.- 5 Voting on Minimum Wages.- 6 Ideology and Logrolling.- 7 Empirical Estimation of the General Equilibrium Model.- III Contributions.- 8 A Comparison of the 1972 and 1978 Elections: Role of the PACs.- 9 Some Additional Effects of Contributions.- 10 Conclusions and Implications.- Appendix: Analysis of Econometric Models with Qualitative Dependent Variables.- References.
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