Freedom and belief
著者
書誌事項
Freedom and belief
Clarendon Press , Oxford University Press, 1986
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注記
Includes index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
In this book, the author argues that there is a fundamental sense in which there is no such thing as free will or true moral responsibility (as this is ordinarily understood). This conclusion is very hard to accept. On the whole we continue to believe firmly, both that we have free will and that we are truly morally responsible for what we do. The author devotes the main body of the book to an attempt to explain why this is so. He accordingly examines various aspects of the `cognitive phenomenology' of freedom - the nature, causes, and consequences of our deep commitment to belief in freedom. In particular, he considers at length a number of problems that are raised by the suggestion that believing oneself to be a free agent is a necessary condition of being a free agent.
目次
- Introduction
- PART I: METAPHYSICS AND COMMITMENT: Libertarianism, action, and self-determination
- Kant and commitment
- Commitment, illusion, and truth
- Non-rational commitment: a view of freedom
- Phenomenology, commitment, and what might happen
- PART II: THE OBJECTIVIST BASIS: Objectivism: preliminaries
- Choice
- Self-consciousness
- PART III: THE SUBJECTIVIST CHALLENGE: Evidence and independence
- Contravention and convention
- The spectator subject and integration
- The natural epictetans
- The experience of ability to choose
- Subjectivism and the experience of freedom
- Anitomy and truth
- Appendices.
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