Agency theory, information, and incentives

著者

• Bamberg, Günter
• Ballwieser, Wolfgang
• Spremann, Klaus

書誌事項

Agency theory, information, and incentives

Günter Bamberg and Klaus Spremann (eds.) ; with contributions by W. Ballwieser ... [et al.]

Springer-Verlag, c1987

• : us
• : gw

注記

Includes bibliographies and indexes

内容説明・目次

内容説明

Agency Theory is a new branch of economics which focusses on the roles of information and of incentives when individuals cooperate with respect to the utilisation of resources. Basic approaches are coming from microeco- nomic theory as well as from risk analysis. Among the broad variety of ap- plications are: the many designs of contractual arrangements, organiza- tions, and institutions as well as the manifold aspects of the separation of ownership and control so fundamental for business finance. After some twenty years of intensive research in the field of information economics it might be timely to present the most basic issues, questions, models, and applications. This volume Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives offers introductory surveys as well as results of individual rese- arch that seem to shape that field of information economics appropriately. Some 30 authors were invited to present their subjects in such a way that students could easily become acquainted with the main ideas of informa- tion economics. So the aim of Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives is to introduce students at an intermediate level and to accompany their work in classes on microeconomics, information economics, organization, management theory, and business finance. The topics selected form the eight sections of the book: 1. Agency Theory and Risk Sharing 2. Information and Incentives 3. Capital Markets and Moral Hazard 4. Financial Contracting and Dividends 5. External Accounting and Auditing 6. Coordination in Groups 7. Property Rights and Fairness 8. Agency Costs.

目次

• Prologue.- Section 1 Agency Theory and Risk Sharing.- Agent and Principal.- 1. A General View.- 1.1 Cooperation.- 1.2 External Effects.- 1.3 Asymmetric Information.- 1.4 Induced Decision Making.- 1.5 Hierarchy and Delegation.- 1.6 Hidden Effort, Hidden Characteristics.- 2. A Closer Look.- 2.1 Risk Sharing.- 2.2 Induced Effort.- 2.3 The LEN-Model.- 2.4 Agency Costs.- 2.5 Monitoring Signals.- 2.6 Screening.- References.- Managerial Contracting with Public and Private Information.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Assumptions.- 2.1 Risk Preference Function.- 2.2 Sharing Rules.- 2.3 Density Function.- 2.4 Production Function.- 3. A Model with Public Information.- 3.1 The Nature of Risk Sharing.- 3.2 Risk Sharing and Observable Effort.- 4. A Model with Private Information.- 4.1 The Manager's Decision Problem.- 4.2 The Principal's Decision Problem.- 4.3 Comparing the Contracts.- References.- Risk Sharing and Subcontracting.- 1. Introduction.- 2. A Parsimoniously Parameterized Model.- 3. Explicit Solutions.- 3.1 Optimal Effort of the Agent.- 3.2 Pareto Optimal Solutions.- 3.3 Solution of the Principal Agent Problem.- 4. Discussion of the Optimal Sharing Rate.- 4.1 Effect of Covariances.- 4.2 Effect of Risk Attitudes.- 5. Some Remarks on the Relaxation of Assumptions.- 5.1 Incorporation of Additional Accounting Costs.- 5.2 Arbitrary Effort Functions.- 5.3 Nonlinear Contracts.- 5.4 Heterogeneous Expectations.- 5.5 Effort Dependent Cost Variance.- References.- Section 2 Information and Incentives.- Information Systems for Principal-Agent Problems.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Decision Problems with Additional Information.- 3. Principal-Agent Problems.- 4. Parameter Information.- 5. Agency Information.- 6. Conclusion.- References.- Information Systems and the Design of Optimal Contracts.- 1. Introduction.- 2. The Model.- 3. Results.- 3.1 Costless Signals.- 3.2 Costly Signals.- 4. Conclusion.- References.- Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for the Allocation of Public Goods.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Why Does a Competitive Profit System not Work?.- 3. Lindahl's Tax Scheme.- 4. How are Incentive Compatible Mechanisms Constructed?.- 5. Characterization of a Certain Class of Tax Schemes.- References.- Incentives to Forecast Honestly.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Some Applications.- 3. The Model.- 4. Some Results.- 5. A Simple Case.- 6. Research Agenda..- References.- Section 3 Capital Markets and Moral Hazard.- Moral Hazard and Equilibrium Credit Rationing: An Overview of the Issues.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Moral Hazard and Equilibrium Credit Rationing: The Leading Example.- 2.1 Loan Contracts and Risk Taking.- 2.2 Equilibrium Credit Rationing.- 3. Extensions and Modifications of the Analysis.- 3.1 Collateral as an Incentive Device.- 3.2 Credit Rationing and the Level of Investment.- 3.3 Share Finance.- 4. Rationing in the General Theory of Optimal Contracts under Moral Hazard.- 4.1 Optimal Finance Contracts and Rationing in a Model of Double Moral Hazard.- 4.2 Rationing and the Individual Rationality Constraint in a Parameterized Principal-Agent Problem.- Appendix: Sufficiency of the First-Order-Condition Approach.- References.- The Liquidation Decision as a Principal-Agent Problem.- 1. Introduction.- 2. The Liquidation Decision with Creditors as Principals.- 3. The Liquidation Decision with Creditors and Customers as Principals.- 3.1 The Problem and the Solution of Titman.- 3.2 Can the Problem be Solved by Changing the Price Policy of the Firm?.- 3.3 An Alternative Solution.- 4. Some Remarks with Respect to further Principals.- References.- On Stakeholders' Unanimity.- 1. Introduction.- 2. The Dependence of Stakeholders' Consumption Opportunities on Corporate Policy.- 2.1 Notations and Conventions for Model Representation.- 2.2 Simplifying Assumptions and Their Consequences.- 3. Two Typical Sources of Conflict and Their Interaction.- 3.1 The Conflict Between Owners and Creditors.- 3.2 The Conflict Between Owners and Managers.- 3.3 The Relations Between Managers, Owners, and Creditors.- 4. Concluding Remarks and Some Topics for Future Research.- 5. Appendices.- 5.1 Appendix I: On the Mathematical Structure of Consumption Opportunity Sets.- 5.2 Appendix II: Proof of Separation I.- 5.3 Appendix III: Proof of Separation II.- References.- Section 4 Financial Contracting and Dividends.- Signalling and Market Behavior.- 1. Introduction.- 2. A Review of the Harrison-Kreps-Model.- 2.1 Assumptions.- 2.2 The Price Process.- 3. Extensions and Signals.- 3.1 General Incentives for Signalling.- 3.2 Signals and Expected Returns.- 3.3 Further Results.- 3.4 Example.- 4. Switching Behavior.- 4.1 Example.- 4.2 Incentives for Recommendations.- 5. Conclusion.- References.- Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information.- 1. Introduction.- 2. The Basic Concepts of Signalling Theory.- 3. Towards a Theory of Corporate Dividend Policy.- 3.1. Survey of Existing Dividend Signalling Models..- 3.2. Corporate Dividend Policy in a Moral Hazard Scenario.- 3.2.1. Investment Decisions and Debt Financing.- 3.2.2. Dividend Constraints and Stockholder - Bondholder Conflict.- 3.2.3. Optimal Investment Policy under a Dividend Constraint.- 4. Signalling under a Theory of Optimal Dividend Policy.- 5. Summary and Conclusions.- References.- Why Leasing? An Introduction to Comparative Contractual Analysis.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Modelling the Leasing Contract: Analytical Framework.- 3. The Optimal Contract with Asymmetric Information.- 4. The Impact of Taxation.- 5. Discussion.- 6. Appendix.- References.- Section 5 External Accounting and Auditing.- The Financial Theory of Agency as a Tool for an Analysis of Problems in External Accounting.- 1. Introduction.- 2. The Financial Theory of Agency (FTA): A Basic Characterization.- 2.1 Agency Relationships in Finance and the Tasks of the FTA.- 2.2 A Description of Agency Problems.- 2.3 A Framework for an Investigation of Covenants.- 3. The General Relationship Between the FTA and External Accounting.- 3.1 Positive and Normative Questions in Accounting.- 3.2 The FTA and Normative Accounting Research.- 3.3 The FTA and Positive Accounting Research.- 4. Some Applications of the FTA in the Field of External Accounting.- 4.1 Preliminaries.- 4.2 The Relationship Between a Mitigation of Agency Problems and the Goal "Protection of Creditors's Tax Scheme.- 4. How are Incentive Compatible Mechanisms Constructed?.- 5. Characterization of a Certain Class of Tax Schemes.- References.- Incentives to Forecast Honestly.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Some Applications.- 3. The Model.- 4. Some Results.- 5. A Simple Case.- 6. Research Agenda..- References.- Section 3 Capital Markets and Moral Hazard.- Moral Hazard and Equilibrium Credit Rationing: An Overview of the Issues.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Moral Hazard and Equilibrium Credit Rationing: The Leading Example.- 2.1 Loan Contracts and Risk Taking.- 2.2 Equilibrium Credit Rationing.- 3. Extensions and Modifications of the Analysis.- 3.1 Collateral as an Incentive Device.- 3.2 Credit Rationing and the Level of Investment.- 3.3 Share Finance.- 4. Rationing in the General Theory of Optimal Contracts under Moral Hazard.- 4.1 Optimal Finance Contracts and Rationing in a Model of Double Moral Hazard.- 4.2 Rationing and the Individual Rationality Constraint in a Parameterized Principal-Agent Problem.- Appendix: Sufficiency of the First-Order-Condition Approach.- References.- The Liquidation Decision as a Principal-Agent Problem.- 1. Introduction.- 2. The Liquidation Decision with Creditors as Principals.- 3. The Liquidation Decision with Creditors and Customers as Principals.- 3.1 The Problem and the Solution of Titman.- 3.2 Can the Problem be Solved by Changing the Price Policy of the Firm?.- 3.3 An Alternative Solution.- 4. Some Remarks with Respect to further Principals.- References.- On Stakeholders' Unanimity.- 1. Introduction.- 2. The Dependence of Stakeholders' Consumption Opportunities on Corporate Policy.- 2.1 Notations and Conventions for Model Representation.- 2.2 Simplifying Assumptions and Their Consequences.- 3. Two Typical Sources of Conflict and Their Interaction.- 3.1 The Conflict Between Owners and Creditors.- 3.2 The Conflict Between Owners and Managers.- 3.3 The Relations Between Managers, Owners, and Creditors.- 4. Concluding Remarks and Some Topics for Future Research.- 5. Appendices.- 5.1 Appendix I: On the Mathematical Structure of Consumption Opportunity Sets.- 5.2 Appendix II: Proof of Separation I.- 5.3 Appendix III: Proof of Separation II.- References.- Section 4 Financial Contracting and Dividends.- Signalling and Market Behavior.- 1. Introduction.- 2. A Review of the Harrison-Kreps-Model.- 2.1 Assumptions.- 2.2 The Price Process.- 3. Extensions and Signals.- 3.1 General Incentives for Signalling.- 3.2 Signals and Expected Returns.- 3.3 Further Results.- 3.4 Example.- 4. Switching Behavior.- 4.1 Example.- 4.2 Incentives for Recommendations.- 5. Conclusion.- References.- Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information.- 1. Introduction.- 2. The Basic Concepts of Signalling Theory.- 3. Towards a Theory of Corporate Dividend Policy.- 3.1. Survey of Existing Dividend Signalling Models..- 3.2. Corporate Dividend Policy in a Moral Hazard Scenario.- 3.2.1. Investment Decisions and Debt Financing.- 3.2.2. Dividend Constraints and Stockholder - Bondholder Conflict.- 3.2.3. Optimal Investment Policy under a Dividend Constraint.- 4. Signalling under a Theory of Optimal Dividend Policy.- 5. Summary and Conclusions.- References.- Why Leasing? An Introduction to Comparative Contractual Analysis.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Modelling the Leasing Contract: Analytical Framework.- 3. The Optimal Contract with Asymmetric Information.- 4. The Impact of Taxation.- 5. Discussion.- 6. Appendix.- References.- Section 5 External Accounting and Auditing.- The Financial Theory of Agency as a Tool for an Analysis of Problems in External Accounting.- 1. Introduction.- 2. The Financial Theory of Agency (FTA): A Basic Characterization.- 2.1 Agency Relationships in Finance and the Tasks of the FTA.- 2.2 A Description of Agency Problems.- 2.3 A Framework for an Investigation of Covenants.- 3. The General Relationship Between the FTA and External Accounting.- 3.1 Positive and Normative Questions in Accounting.- 3.2 The FTA and Normative Accounting Research.- 3.3 The FTA and Positive Accounting Research.- 4. Some Applications of the FTA in the Field of External Accounting.- 4.1 Preliminaries.- 4.2 The Relationship Between a Mitigation of Agency Problems and the Goal "Protection of Creditors' Interests".- 4.3 The Role of the "Principle of Caution" in Resolving Agency Problems in Simple Scenarios.- 4.4 Payout Restrictions in Complex Scenarios.- 5. Concluding Remarks.- References.- Asymmetric Information between Investors and Managers under the New German Accounting Legislation.- 1. Subject Limitations.- 2. The Concept of "Information Structure".- 3. The Possibilities of Analysing the Balance Sheet.- 3.0 General Remarks.- 3.1 Property Structure (Assets).- 3.2 Capital Structure (Equity & Liabilities).- 3.3 Financial Structure (Horizontal Key Figures).- 3.4 Statement of Changes in Financial Position/Cash Flow Analysis.- 4. The Possibilities of Analysing the Profit and Loss Account.- 4.0 General Remarks.- 4.1 Analysing the Result.- 5. Statutory Audit Requirements.- 6. Disclosure Requirements.- 7. Possible Effects.- 7.0 Recognizable Problem Areas.- 7.1 Experiences to Date.- 8. Conclusion.- References.- Auditing in an Agency Setting.- 1. The Problem.- 2. A Basic Model.- 3. The Value of Auditing.- 4. An Extended Model.- 5. The Advantages and Problems of the Auditor.- 5.1 Gains from Auditing by an Auditor.- 5.2 Problems caused by the Auditor.- 6. Conclusions.- 6.1 The Stability of Results.- 6.2 Practical Relevance.- References.- Investigation Strategies with Costly Perfect Information.- 1. Introduction.- 2. The Model without Communications.- 3. Occurrence of Random Investigation.- 4. The Value of Communication.- 5. Communcation and Sufficient Penalty.- 6. Communication and Insufficient Penalty.- 7. Conclusions.- References.- Section 6 Coordination in Groups.- Managers as Principals and Agents.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Managers as Principals
• Span of Control.- 3. The Production Function.- 3.1 Linear Homogeneous Production Function.- 3.2 Cobb Douglas Production Function.- 4. Managers as Agents.- 4.1 Manager's Effort.- 4.2 Optimal Share
• Comparison with v. Thunen's Wage Formula.- 4.3 Cost of Agency.- 4.4 Multi-Level Organization.- 5. Increasing Returns to Scale.- 5.1 Manager's Effort.- 5.2 Feasibility Conditions and Optimal Share.- References.- Misperceptions, Equilibrium, and Incentives in Groups and Organizations.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Organizational Design and Incentives.- 2.1 Elements of Organizational Design.- 2.2 The Principal's Design Problem.- 3. Design Problems Under Perfect Information.- 3.1 Noncooperative Sharing Systems
• Holmstrom's Theorem.- 3.2 Nash Bargaining-Cooperative Results.- 3.3 Remarks on Principal-Managed vs. Labor-Managed Enterprises.- 4. Misperceptions and Group Incentives.- 4.1 Consistent Non-cooperative Equilibrium.- 4.2 Sufficient Conditions for the Existence of Consistent Equilibria.- 4.3 Illustrative Example on the Effects of Misperceptions on Efficiency.- 5. Concluding Remarks and Review of Relevant Empirical Studies.- Intertemporal Sharecropping: A Differential Game Approach.- 1. Differential Games.- 1.1 Problem Formulation and Open Loop Information Structure.- 1.2 Solution Concepts.- 2. The Model.- 3. Nash Equilibrium.- 3.1 Problem of Player 1.- 3.2 Problem of Player 2.- 4. Stackelberg Equilibrium.- 4.1 Necessary Optimality Conditions.- 4.2 Characterization of Possible Regimes.- 4.3 Explicit Solution.- 5. Comparison of the Nash and Stackelberg Equilibria.- 6. Pareto Solutions, Optimal Threats, and Cooperative Nash Equilibria.- 6.1 Pareto Solutions.- 6.2 Optimal Threats and Bargaining Solution.- 7. Concluding Remarks.- References.- Section 7 Property Rights and Fairness.- Mangerialism versus the Property Rights Theory of the Firm.- 1. Definition of the Problem.- 2. Theoretical Assertions Regarding the Separation of Ownership and Control in the Modern Publicly-Held Corporation.- 2.1 Managerialists.- 2.2 Property Rights Theory of the Firm.- 3. The Controversy in Light of the Results of Empirical Research.- 3.1 The Basic Structure of Empirical Studies.- 3.2 An Overview of Study Results.- 4. Conclusions.- References.- Contract, Agency, and the Delegation of Decision Making.- 1. Introduction: Equivocations in the History of Agency Theory.- 2. Agency - A Special Case of Contract?.- 3. Delegation and Discretion as Central Elements of Agency.- 4. The Concept of Contract.- 5. The Concept of Agency.- 6. Contractual and Non-contractual Agency Relations.- 7. Conclusion: A Tentative Matrix of Contract and Agency Features.- References.- A Note on Fair Equality of Rules.- 1. Introduction.- 2. The Problem.- 3. Fair Equality of Rules as a Constitutional Dilemma.- 4. The Position of the Supreme Court.- References.- Section 8 Agency Costs.- Agency Costs and Transaction Costs: Flops in the Principal-Agent-Theory of Financial Markets.- 1. The Agency-Problem and the Ways of its Solution.- 2. The Flop Named "Agency Costs".- 3. The Flop Named "Transaction Costs".- 4. Alternatives to Incentives as Solutions of Principal-Agent-Problems.- 5. Conclusion.- References.- Agency Costs are not a "Flop"!.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Cost as a Quantitative Term.- 3. Do Agency Costs Fail to Explain Somethings.- 4. Do Agency Costs Fail to Solve a Practical Problem?.- 5. Implications.- References.- About Contributors.- Author Index.

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詳細情報

• NII書誌ID(NCID): BA03700476
• ISBN:
  • 0387184228
  • 3540184228
• LCCN: 87027689
• 出版国コード: gw
• タイトル言語コード: eng
• 本文言語コード: eng
• 出版地: Berlin ; Tokyo
• ページ数/冊数: xviii, 533 p.
• 大きさ: 25 cm
• 分類:
  • LCC : HD3858
  • DC19 : 658.4
• 件名:
  • LCSH : Contracting out
  • LCSH : Risk
  • LCSH : Information theory in economics