Soviet foreign trade : the decision process
著者
書誌事項
Soviet foreign trade : the decision process
(Dimensions of international business)
Kluwer-Nijhoff Pub., c1983
大学図書館所蔵 全25件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
  茨城
  栃木
  群馬
  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
  ベルギー
  オランダ
  スウェーデン
  ノルウェー
  アメリカ
注記
Bibliography: p. 171-185
Includes index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
The enigma of Soviet society is nowhere more strikingly manifested than in its economic relations with the outside world. Western business people, even those with representative offices in Moscow, often describe their negotiations with the Soviets as a veritable black-box affair. Offers for purchase and sale are funneled into the bureaucracy, usually via the Ministry of Foreign Trade, where they are digested for very long periods of time. When a response emerges, little is usually known about the level at which decisions were made, and even less is known about the criteria that were employed to make them. In the abstract, at least, foreign trade decision making in the Western market economies is a rather simple exercise. An American consumer will purchase a Toyota rather than a comparable Chrysler if its price, expressed in dollars at the market exchange rate, is lower. The influences of governmental tariffs, quantitative restrictions, foreign exchange controls, "buy American" policies, and the like, are usually of only secondary importance. In contrast, the Soviet consumer, whether an individual or an industrial enterprise, does not generally have the authority to order the importation of goods or services. That authority is concentrated at the top of Soviet society and administered through a labyrinthine system of overlapping bureaucratic agencies. Furthermore, those Soviet agencies cannot respond to price signals in the same way as the American consumer can, because Soviet domestic prices and exchange rates are themselves set rather arbitrarily by governmental agencies.
目次
1 An Overview: The Bureaucracy and the Plan.- The Foreign Trade Bureaucracies.- Foreign Trade Planning.- 2 The Party and the Government.- The Communist Party.- The National Government.- Motivations of the Political Leadership.- 3 The Central Planning Agencies.- The State Planning Committee (Gosplan).- The State Committee for Material and Technical Supply (Gossnab).- The State Committee for Science and Technology.- The Ministry of Finance and the State Bank.- The State Price Committee.- 4 The Foreign Trade and Industrial Ministries.- The Ministry of Foreign Trade.- The Industrial Ministries.- 5 Cost-Benefit Analysis for Foreign Trade.- Foreign Trade Efficiency Indices: A Brief History.- Efficiency Indices for Simple Commodity Trade.- Inadequacies of Domestic Prices.- Replacement of Prices with Full-Cost Indices.- Advantages of Wholesale Prices over Full-Cost Indices.- Special Problems of Import Valuation.- Efficiency Indices for Specialization Agreements.- Efficiency Indices for Credit Deliveries.- Efficiency Indices for Compensation Agreements.- Efficiency Indices for Trade in Licenses.- Practical Application of Efficiency Indices.- 6 Foreign Trade Optimization Models.- The Trzeciakowski Model.- Shagalov's Basic Model.- Dynamic Models.- Interregional Models.- Models of Socialist Economic Integration.- Branch Models.- 7 Empirical Analyses of Soviet Foreign Trade Decision Making.- The Commodity Structure of Soviet Foreign Trade.- The Traditional View.- Fundamental Comparative Advantage.- Cross-Sectional Commodity Studies.- 8 Summary and Conclusions.- Notes.- References.
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