New institutional dimensions of economics : comparative elaboration and application
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Bibliographic Information
New institutional dimensions of economics : comparative elaboration and application
（Studies in contemporary economics）
Springer-Verlag, c1988
- : Berlin
- : New York
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Description and Table of Contents
Description
Among economists the recognition of the importance of social and eco 1 nomic institutions has grown during the last ten years. Even be fore the more recent period, however, this trend of thought was 2 clearly noticeable. The origin and formation of institutions was one of the issues which, according to C. MENGER, should playa central 3 role in economics. Nevertheless, this tradition is not reflected in mainstream eco nomics. L. HURWICZ characterizes this failure by observing that "tra ditionally, economic analysis treats the economic system as one of the givens" (1973, p. 1). In this case "system" may be understood in a narrower or in a wider sense comprising only contracts (on markets) or a larger variety of procedures for the co-ordination of economic activities as, for instance, managerial hierarchies. In view of the prominent role of price theory in mainstream economics one would guess that-the system is perceived to comprise mainly contracts as co-ordinating procedures: prices form a constituent part of contracts on markets but not of other co-ordination procedures. This indicates an understanding in the narrow sense. There is an additional and even more convincing argument in favour of our contention that mainstream economics is based on this narrow interpretation of the economic system: It evaluates alternative situations by reference to the allocation of the factors of production, i. e. by comparing outcomes of the economic process. Doing so is only logical if the economic system is understood as a system of contracting on markets.
Table of Contents
One: From Rational Choice Towards Institutional Variability.- 1: Economic Systems from the Co-Ordination Perspective.- 1. Different Versions of Systems.- 2. Attitudes towards Transactions.- 3. The Coase Systems Perspective.- 4. Attitudes towards Transaction Costs.- 5. The Role of the Rational Choice Model.- 6. Coase Systems and Rational Choice.- 7. Preliminary Orientation.- 2: A Comprehensive Version of Institutional Choice.- 1. Partial and Comprehensive Versions of Institutional Choice.- 2. A More Comprehensive Model with Special Initial Conditions.- 3. A More Comprehensive Model with General Initial Conditions.- 4. Introducing Algorithms for Macro and Micro Choice.- 5. Summary and Conclusions.- 3: A Rational and More Comprehensive Framework for Industrial Organization Studies.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Technological Change.- 3. Agency Relations in Large Enterprises.- 4. A More General Agency Concept.- 5. Multi-Unit Enterprises and the Behaviour of Operational Units on Markets.- 6. Principal-Agency Relations in Regulated Industries.- 7. The Explanation of Transaction Gaps in Inter-Industry Co-Ordination.- 8. Propositions.- Two: The Co-Ordination Perspective Elaborated.- 4: The Scope of the Systems Approach.- 1. A General Perspective.- 2. A Systems Perspective.- 3. Co-Ordination Procedures as a Set of Basic Characteristics.- 4. Co-Ordination Procedures and Subsystems.- 5. Criteria for the Distinction of Co-Ordination Procedures.- 6. The Specification of Systems.- 7. Behaviour.- 8. Summary.- 9. Deriving Behavioural Expectations.- 5: Co-Ordination Procedures between Subsystems: Economic Policy Regimes.- 1. Introduction.- 2. The Government/Industry Interface.- 3. Co-Ordination Procedures at the Government/Industry Interface.- 6: Co-Ordination Procedures between Subsystems: Governance Procedures.- 1. The Government/Management Interface.- 2. Assignment of Rights between Governance and Management.- 3. Governance Procedures.- 4. General Observations on Governance Procedures.- 5. Conclusions.- Three: The Co-Ordination Perspective with some Basic Behavioural and cost Relationships.- 7: Governance/Management Co-Ordination under Alternative Economic Policy Regimes.- 1. Introduction.- 2. The Principal/Agent Relationship.- 3. Governance Costs.- 4. Changing Regime Conditions.- 5. Conclusions.- 8: Incentive Failures and the Scale of Government Participation in the Co-Ordination of Industries.- 1. Institutional Choice and Optimal Allocation.- 2. Optimal Allocation as a One-Dimensional Criterion.- 3. Incentive-Failure of Co-Ordination Procedures.- 4. The Scale of Government Participation in Economic Co-Ordination.- 5. Different Systems of Sanctions (Incentives) to Governments in the Economic Perspective.- 6. Expediency versus Efficiency.- 7. Preliminary Conclusions.- 8. Dictatorships.- 9. Conclusions.- 9: The Nature of Transaction Costs and Benefits.- 1. Regime and Governance Costs.- 2. A Concept of Regime and Governance Costs.- 3. Industry-Specific Governance Cost Differences upon Variation of Regimes in Railroad Organization.- 4. Regime and Governance Costs in Electricity Generation.- 5. Comparative Cost Differences and Regime (Governance) Choice.- 6. Conclusions.- 10: Towards an Integration of Structural and Behavioural Characteristics of Different Economic Systems.- 1. Retrospect on Behavioural Relationships.- 2. From "Idealtypen" towards a Descriptive Notion of the Specific National Economic Systems.- 3. The Analytical Use of the "Systems-Interface".- Four: Behavioural and Economic Consequences of Different Economic Systems.- 11: A System with Dominant Government Directory Regimes.- 1. A Perspective on Complex Systems.- 2. Structural Characteristics of the Soviet-Type System.- 3. Behavioural Characteristics.- 4. Allocational Characteristics.- 5. Competitive Atmosphere.- 6. Conclusion.- 12: A System with Dominant Regulatory Regimes.- 1. Introductory Remarks.- 2. Structural Characteristics and Desiderata.- 3. Behavioural Characteristics of Regulators and Managers.- 4. Regulatory Behaviour in Different Political Systems.- 5. Behaviour of Managers and Technological Progress.- 6. Preliminary Conclusions.- 7. Allocational Characteristics.- 13: A System with Dominant Commercial Regimes.- 1. A Perspective View.- 2. Structural Characteristics.- 3. Behavioural Characteristics.- 4. Conclusions.- 14: Retrospect and Prospect.- 1. Propositions.- 2. Regularities between Types of Characteristics.- 3. Types of Systems.- Literature.
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