Plato's Theaetetus
著者
書誌事項
Plato's Theaetetus
Clarendon Press , Oxford University Press, 1988
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注記
Bibliography: p. [280]-282
Includes index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
"Theaetetus" is one of Plato's dialogues which reveals Plato's position on his question "what is knowledge?" This work is a philosophical analysis and critique of the "Theaetetus". The author examines Plato's arguments and the issues that they raise, showing the text as a transitional work in Plato's writings between the confident pronouncements of the middle dialogues, and the equally confident, but different views of the later dialogues. The relations between the "Theaetetus" and other works of Plato are included. Plato presents a problem that he himself seems to be unable to resolve but rival interpretations of the text are also examined. The author also refers to well-known views of Locke, Berkeley and Hume, Frege and Russell, Quine, Strawson, Kripke and others. He does not presuppose any knowledge of Greek.
目次
- Introduction: chronology - the "Theaetetus" and the "Sophist"
- background - knowledge and the forms - the "Meno" and recollection
- forms as paradigms and as universals, forms and knowledge in the "Timaeus"
- the question "what is knowledge" (143d-151d). Part 1 Knowledge and perception: the theory that perception is knowledge - Theaetetus and Protagoras (151e-152c), Protagoras and Heraclitus (152d-153d), a priori considerations, first statement - 153d-154b, second statement - 155e - 157c, third statement - 157e-160a, final statement - 160a-e, comments
- the refutation of the theory - the refutation of Protagoras (161a-179c), the refutation of Heraclitus (181c-183b)
- the refutation of Theaetetus (184b-186e) - the final argument (186c7-e12) Cooper's and McDowell's interpretations
- interim review. Part 2 Knowledge and belief: false belief - first puzzle - knowing what one is thinking of (187e-188c), second puzzle - believing what is not (188d-189b), return to first puzzle - other judging (189c-191a), first solution - the wax tablet (191a-196c), second solution - the aviary (196c-200c), knowledge as requiring an account (200e-201c)
- true belief with an account - the theory of Socrates' dream (201c-202d), the refutation of Socrates' dream (202e-206c), three ways of taking "an account" (206c-210a), lines of interpretation - Cornford's, Fine's and White's interpretations
- evaluation - the coherence of the "Theaetetus", resolution of Plato's problem.
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