Dynamic policy games in economics : essays in honour of Piet Verheyen
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Dynamic policy games in economics : essays in honour of Piet Verheyen
(Contributions to economic analysis, 181)
North-Holland , Sole distributors for the U.S.A. and Canada, Elsevier Science Pub. Co., 1989
Available at 58 libraries
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Note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
The aim of this volume is to consider intertemporal and strategic issues in the formulation of economic policy so that dynamic game methodology is appropriate. When changes in economic policy are evaluated the reactions and expectations of other economic agents cannot be ignored, and in a dynamic setting issues like time inconsistency, subgame perfectness, reputation and information become important. The papers contained in this volume are the revised versions of those presented at a conference held in 1988 at Tilburg University, The Netherlands. They include methodological contributions and strategic analyses of macroeconomic policy, resource economics, international policy coordination and the arms race.
Table of Contents
Introduction (F. v.d. Ploeg, A.J. d. Zeeuw). Time Consistency and Robustness of Equilibria in Non-Cooperative Dynamic Games (T. Basar). Self-Enforceable Agreements in an N-Player Dynamic Game (C. Fershtman). A Dynamic Heuristic Game Theory Model of an Arms Race (M.D. Intriligator, D. L. Brito). Conflict Over Arms Accumulation in Market and Command Economies (F. v.d. Ploeg, A.J. d. Zeeuw). On Games of Cake-Eating (S. Clemhout, H. Wan, Jr.). Gains and Losses from Cartelisation in Markets for Exhaustible Resources in the Absence of Binding Future Contracts (A. Ulph, D. Ulph). Strategic Wages Policy and the Gains from Cooperation (S.J. Turnovsky, M. Bianconi). Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy Instruments in a Simple Two-Country Game (M.B. Canzoneri, D.W. Henderson). Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations (G.A. Calvo). Monetary Policy in Models with Capital (F.E. Kydland). Macroeconomic Policy Games with Incomplete Information: Some Extensions (J. Driffill). Index.
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