Isolation and paradox : defining "the public" in modern political analysis
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Isolation and paradox : defining "the public" in modern political analysis
(Contributions in political science, no. 233)
Greenwood Press, 1989
Available at 36 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
  Norway
  United States of America
Note
Bibliography: p. [165]-169
Includes index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
The controlling idea for this study, and a major theme in classical and modern social analysis, is the distinction between public and private sectors in liberal societies. Professor Rusciano's purpose is to consider how the common ground defined by the use of the notion public in public opinion and public choice can lead to a revitalization of the term in modern social analysis. In Chapter 1, the author shows that no public choice procedure may distinguish consistently between public and private issues, public and private goods, and public and private decision rules. He also shows that no procedure may consistently define the public realm implied by the term public choice. To illustrate this problem, the author scrutinizes three paradoxes of public choice: Arrow's General Possibility theorem, Olson's logic of collective action, and Barry's problem of legitimizing responsive choice procedures. Succeeding chapters discuss the definition of public advanced in Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann's spiral of silence theory of public opinion; elaborate on the notion of public and the Arrow problem; and apply the theorems derived from Noelle-Neumann's theory to the three paradoxes of public choice. Chapter 5 theoretically applies the argument developed in previous chapters to economic behavior through a critique of Fred Hirsch's Social Limits to Growth and to the problem of collective action. The chapter concludes with a formal model and three hypotheses which are tested in Chapters 6 and 7 through empirical analyses of classic problems in collective action and choice, and as models of a revised notion of social preference. Finally, the revised notion is illustrated by observations about consumer behavior, conventions of language, and the definitions and functions of social and state institutions.
Isolation and Paradox evolved from lectures and seminars delivered while Professor Rusciano was Visiting Professor at the Institut fur Publizistik at the University of Mainz, the German Federal Republic. Political and social scientists, as well as students in political theory, contemporary political analysis, comparative politics, public opinion, and political methodology will find this careful, logical study and its full complement of tables and charts necessary and informative reading.
Table of Contents
The Dilemma The Dilemma Reconsidered: Opinion, Choice, and Public Arrow's Proof and Collective Action The Spiral of Silence and the Rule of Privileged Choice The Fear of Isolation, Fashion, and Collective Behavior Analyses of Collective Behavior Under Varying Conditions of Opinion The Redefined Notion of "Social Preference" Bibliography Index
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