Knowledge and evidence
著者
書誌事項
Knowledge and evidence
（Cambridge studies in philosophy / general editor, Ernest Sosa）
Cambridge University Press, 1989
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注記
Bibliography: p. 267-279
Includes index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Paul Moser's book defends what has been an unfashionable view in recent epistemology: the foundationalist account of knowledge and justification. Since the time of Plato philosophers have wondered what exactly knowledge is. This book develops a new account of perceptual knowledge which specifies the exact sense in which knowledge has foundations. The author argues that experiential foundations are indeed essential to perceptual knowledge, and he explains what knowledge requires beyond justified true beliefs. In challenging prominent sceptical claims that we have no justified beliefs about the external world, the book outlines a theory of rational belief.
目次
- Acknowedgments
- Introduction
- 1. Conditions for propositional knowledge
- 2. Minimal epistemic reasons
- 3. Justifying epistemic reasons
- 4. Foundationalism and some alternatives
- 5. Procedural epistemic rationality
- 6. Propositional knowledge
- References
- Index.
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