The political limits of environmental regulation : tracking the unicorn
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
The political limits of environmental regulation : tracking the unicorn
Quorum Books, 1989
Available at 25 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
  Norway
  United States of America
Note
Bibliography: p. [167]-175
Includes index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
In The Political Limits of Environment Regulation, Bruce Yandle analyzes the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) twenty-year record and concludes that the agency's monopoly powers have not always been conducive to positive environmental results. In fact, Yandle argues, special interest groups and lobbyists have often been very successful in obtaining federal legislation favoring large industries. In constructing his argument, Yandle provides a detailed overview of the EPA's twenty-year efforts at environmental regulation based on numerous empirical investigations aimed at indentifying the chief elements of both major and minor regulatory episodes.
Yandle begins by exploring the origins of the U.S. environmental saga and the status of environmental protection before federal regulation. He goes on to discuss the rise of the federal regulator and such issues as cost minimization and the move to manage hazardous and toxic wastes. Turning to a discussion of the effects of U.S. environmental regulation efforts, Yandle concludes that the EPA has not been as effective as it could be and recommends that state and local governments be given more responsibility for ensuring environmental protection. He suggests further that the country return to competitive regulation, cost-efficient pollution control legislation, flexibility on a state level, and divestiture of the EPA's monopoly in this domain, arguing that these combined actions will enable the EPA and state legislatures to control and protect the environment more efficiently.
Table of Contents
Preface The U.S. Environmental Saga: How It Began Bootleggers, Baptists, and Political Limits Environmental Protection Before Federal Regulation The Rise of the Federal Regulator Yearning for Cost Minimization The Move to Manage Hazardous and Toxic Wastes Effects of the Environmental Saga There Are Political Limits to Environmental Quality Regulation Bibliography Index
by "Nielsen BookData"