Paradoxes of war : on the art of national self-entrapment

Author(s)
Bibliographic Information

Paradoxes of war : on the art of national self-entrapment

Zeev Maoz

(Studies in international conflict, v. 3)

Unwin Hyman, 1990

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Note

Bibliography: p. [335]-349

Includes index

Description and Table of Contents

Description

This book adresses two fundamental questions about the nature of war: why reasonable people sometimes lead their nations into self-made traps of destructive proportions and why nations finding themselves in a deep mess of their own doing tend to deepen their troubles and make it harder for themselves to escape those traps. The study is organized in three parts around the various stages of war. The first focuses on the causes of war; the second on the processes of war management; and the third examines those short and long term implications of war which turn on its head the notion of war as an instrument of policy.

Table of Contents

  • Part 1 Paradoxical causes of war: the para bellum paradox
  • the threat of stability and the stability of threats - the paradox of successful deterrence
  • wars that nobody wanted and everybody tried to prevent - the paradox of crisis escalation. Part 2 Paradoxes of war management: the paradox of attrition
  • the paradox of surprise
  • the ally's paradox. Part 3 Paradoxical consequences of war: the paradox of power and war outcomes
  • phyrric victories, or nothing fails like success
  • loser's paradoxes - the view from the pit
  • paradoxical lessons from paradoxical wars.

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Details
  • NCID
    BA10587894
  • ISBN
    • 004445113X
  • LCCN
    89032673
  • Country Code
    us
  • Title Language Code
    eng
  • Text Language Code
    eng
  • Place of Publication
    Boston
  • Pages/Volumes
    xiii, 368 p.
  • Size
    24 cm
  • Classification
  • Subject Headings
  • Parent Bibliography ID
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