The dynamics of rational deliberation

著者

• Skyrms, Brian

書誌事項

The dynamics of rational deliberation

Brian Skyrms

Harvard University Press, 1990

注記

Includes bibliographical references (p. [181]-195) and index

内容説明・目次

内容説明

Brian Skyrms constructs a theory of "dynamic deliberation" and uses it to investigate rational decision-making in cases of strategic interaction. This illuminating book will be of great interest to all those in many disciplines who use decision theory and game theory to study human behavior and thought. Skyrms begins by discussing the Bayesian theory of individual rational decision and the classical theory of games, which at first glance seem antithetical in the criteria used for determining action. In his effort to show how methods for dealing with information feedback can be productively combined, the author skillfully leads us through the mazes of equilibrium selection, the Nash equilibria for normal and extensive forms, structural stability, causal decision theory, dynamic probability, the revision of beliefs, and, finally, good habits for decision. The author provides many clarifying illustrations and a handy appendix called "Deliberational Dynamics on Your Personal Computer." His powerful model has important implications for understanding the rational origins of convention and the social contract, the logic of nuclear deterrence, the theory of good habits, and the varied strategies of political and economic behavior.

目次

Preface 1. Principles of Rational Decision Two Paradigms of Rational Decision Expected Utility The Theory of Games Integrating the Two Paradigms 2. Dynamic Deliberation: Equilibria Deliberational Dynamics and Game Theory Deliberational Equilibria Games Played by Bayesian Deliberators Equilibrium Selection The Bayes Dynamics Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium for the Normal Form Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium for the Extensive Form Correlated Equilibria Equilibria and Rationality 3. Dynamic Deliberation: Stability Dynamic Stability of Equilibria Imprecise Priors and Elicitation through Deliberation Structural Stability I Structural Stability II Stability and Rationality 4. The Value of Knowledge Good Thinking Probable Knowledge Ramsey's Anticipation Dynamic Probability and Generalized Learning Generalized Learning Generalized Generalized Causal Decision Theory Deliberational Equilibrium Reconsidered M Is for Martingale 5. Dynamic Coherence Pumping Gold Coherent Expectations Utility Prevision and Measure Coherent Preferences and Upper and Lower Probabilities Dynamic Coherence Bayes' Rule Bayes' Method Probability Kinematics Black-Box Learning and Higher-Order Probabilities Rules and Reference Coherence and Deliberation 6. Good Habits On the Rational Stability of Good Habits Finite Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Beyond Common Knowledge of Rationality Choosing Good Habits Just Habits The Social Contract Revisited Taking Turns Good Habits and Game Theory 7. Prospects for a Theory of Rational Deliberation Consistency Proofs Causal Independence and Rationalizability Nash Equilibrium Reconsidered Dynamics Fictitious Play by Carnapians More Sophisticated Deliberators The Tracing Procedure Toward a Theory of Dynamic Deliberation Appendix. Deliberational Dynamics on Your Personal Computer Notes References Index

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詳細情報

• NII書誌ID(NCID): BA10785901
• ISBN:
  • 067421885X
• LCCN: 89038949
• 出版国コード: us
• タイトル言語コード: eng
• 本文言語コード: eng
• 出版地: Cambridge, Mass.
• ページ数/冊数: x, 199 p.
• 大きさ: 25 cm
• 分類:
  • LCC : QA279.5
  • DC20 : 519.5/42
• 件名:
  • LCSH : Bayesian statistical decision theory
  • LCSH : Game theory