Game theory and economic modelling
著者
書誌事項
Game theory and economic modelling
Clarendon Press , Oxford University Press, 1990
- : hard
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注記
Includes bibliography (p. [187]-191) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Over the past two decades, academic economics has undergone a mild revolution in methodology. The language, concepts and techniques of non-cooperative game theory have become central to the discipline. This book looks at why game theory has become such a popular tool of analysis. It examines the deficiencies in this methodology and goes on to consider whether its popularity will fade or whether it will remain an important tool for economists.
目次
- The standard
- Basic notions of non-cooperative game theory: Strategic form games
- Extensive form games
- Extensive and strategic form games
- Dominance
- Nash equilibrium
- The successes of game theory: Taxonomy based on the strategic form
- Dynamics and extensive form games
- Incredble threats and incredible promises
- Credible threats and promises: co-operation and reputation
- The importance of what players know about others
- The problems of game theory: Bilateral bargaining and precise protocols
- Too many equilibria and no way to choose
- choosing among equilibria with refinements
- The rules of the game
- Bounded rationality and retrospection.
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