Perspectives on positive political economy

Author(s)

• Alt, James E.
• Shepsle, Kenneth A.

Bibliographic Information

Perspectives on positive political economy

edited by James E. Alt, Kenneth A. Shepsle

（Political economy of institutions and decisions）

Cambridge University Press, 1990

• : hbk
• : pbk

Note

"A number of commissioned pieces for a series of seminars on political economy held in Cambridge, Massachusetts, at Harvard University in the fall of 1987" -- p. x

Bibliography: p. 245-255

Includes index

Description and Table of Contents

Description

This volume serves as an introduction to the field of positive political economy and the economic and political processes with which it is concerned. This new research tradition is distinct from both normative and historical approaches to political economy. Grounded in the rational-actor methodology of microeconomics, positive political economy is the study of rational decisions in a context of political and economic institutions. More analytical than traditional approaches, it is concerned with the derivation of principles and propositions against which real-world experience may be compared. Its focus is on empirical regularities, and its goal is theoretical explanation. The field has focused on three main areas of research: models of collective action, constraints on competitive market processes, and the analysis of transaction costs. Developments in all of these areas are covered in the book. The first part of the volume surveys the field, while the second part displays positive political economy at work, examining a variety of subjects. The final part contains essays by leading political economists on the theoretical foundations of the field.

Table of Contents

• Series editors' preface
• Acknowledgements
• Editors' introduction James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle
• Part I. The New Political Economy: 1. The emerging discipline of political economy Peter C. Ordeshook
• 2. Macropolitical economy in the field of development Robert H. Bates
• Part II. Organizations, Transactions, and Opportunities: 3. Bargaining costs, influence costs, and the organization of economic activity Paul Milgrom and John Roberts
• 4. Corporate culture and economic theory David M. Kreps
• 5. Amenity potential, indivisibilities, and political competition Harold Demsetz
• Part III. Reflections on Theoretical Foundations: 6. Political science and rational choice William H. Riker
• 7. Institutions and a transaction-cost theory of exchange Douglas C. North
• 8. The costs of special privilege Gordon Tullock
• 9. Toward a unified view of economics and the other social sciences Mancur Olson
• Notes
• References
• Index.

by "Nielsen BookData"

Details

• NCID: BA11344162
• ISBN:
  • 0521392217
  • 0521398517
• LCCN: 90001567
• Country Code: uk
• Title Language Code: eng
• Text Language Code: eng
• Place of Publication: Cambridge
• Pages/Volumes: x, 268 p.
• Size: 24 cm
• Classification:
  • LCC : HB99.5
  • DC20 : 338.9
• Subject Headings:
  • LCSH : Institutional economics -- Congresses
  • LCSH : Social choice -- Congresses
  • LCSH : Decision-making -- Congresses
• Parent Bibliography ID:
  • BA01170702