Game theory and applications
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Game theory and applications
（Economic theory, econometrics, and mathematical economics）
Academic Press, c1990
Available at 66 libraries
Note
"The work collected in this volume are based on presentations at the International Conference on Game Theory and Applications held at The Ohio State University, June 18-24, 1987" -- Pref
Includes bibliographical references
Description and Table of Contents
Description
Game Theory and Applications outlines game theory and proves its validity by examining it alongside the neoclassical paradigm. This book contends that the neoclassical theory is the exceptional case, and that game theory may indeed be the rule. The papers and abstracts collected here explore its recent development and suggest new research directions.
Table of Contents
Contributed Papers:
E. Kohlberg, Refinement of Nash Equilibrium: The Main Ideas.
S. Sorin, Supergames.
F. Forges, Infinitely Repeated Games with Incomplete Information.
J.-F. Mertens, Repeated Games.
E. Kalai, Bounded Rationality and Strategic Complexity in Repeated Games.
R. Aumann, The Shapley Value.
S. Hart, Advances in Value Theory.
B. Peleg, Axiomatizations of the Core, the Nucleolus, and the Prekernel.
M. Maschler, Consistency.
W. Thompson, The Consistency Principle.
J. Rosenmuller, Discrete Concepts in n-Person Game Theory: Nondegeneracy and Homogeneity.
A.E. Roth, Two-Sided Matching Markets: An Overview of Some Theory and Empirical Evidence.
M. Shubik, Strategic Market Game Models of Exchange Economies.
M.I. Kamien, Y. Tauman, and S. Zamir, Information Transmission.
H. Moulin, Monotonic Surplus Sharing and the Utilization of Common Property Resources.
W.F. Lucas, Developments in Stable Set Theory.
R.D. McKelvey, Game Theoretic Models of Voting in Multidimensional Issue Spaces.
S. Mishal, D. Schmeidler, and I. Sened, Israel and the PLO: A Game with Differential Information.
K. Fan, A Survey of Some Results Closely Related to the Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz Theorem.
Selected Abstracts:
M.L. Balinski and D. Gale, On the Core of the Assignment Game.
B. Cornet, The Second Welfare Theorem in Nonconvex Economies.
S. Ellner and A. Shmida, An Evolutionary Game Theory Model for Risk-Taking.
S. Hart and A. Neyman, Values of Nonatomic Vector Measure Games: Are They Linear Combinations of the Measures?
M. Hellwig and W. Leininger, Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Discrete and Continuous Games-Does Discretization Matter?
R. Holzman, To Vote or Not to Vote: What is the Quota?
R. Holzman, E. Lehrer, and N. Linial, Some Bounds for the Banzhaf Index and Other Semivalues.
T. Ichiishi, Comparative Cooperative Games Theory.
W. Leininger, Escalation and Cooperation in International Conflicts--The Dollar-Auction Revisited.
A. Levy and R.P. McLean, An Axiomatization of the Nonsymmetric Nontransferable Utility Value.
D. Monderer, A Milnor Condition for Nonatomic Lipschitz Games and Its Applications.
A.S. Nowak, Zero-Sum Nonstationary Stochastic Games with General State Space.
A. Okada, Perfect Equilibrium Points and Lexicographic Domination.
A. Okada, A Two-Person Repeated Bargaining Game with Long-Term Contracts.
H. Peters and P. Wakker, Independence of Irrelevant Alternative and Revealed Group Preferences.
R. Radner and A. Schotter, The Sealed-Bid Mechanism: An Experimental Study.
M.A. Satterthwaite and S.R. Williams, Rate of Convergence to Full Efficiency in the Buyers' Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large.
R. Telgarsky, Stationary Strategies in Deterministic Games.
S. Tijs, "Big Boss Games, Clan Games, and Information Market Games.
M.H. Wooders, Large Games and Economics with Near-Exhaustion of Gains to Coalition Formation.
M.H. Wooders and W.R. Zame, Values of Large Finite Games.
Index.
by "Nielsen BookData"