The aristocracy of the long robe : the origins of judicial review in America
著者
書誌事項
The aristocracy of the long robe : the origins of judicial review in America
(Contributions in legal studies, no. 52)
Greenwood Press, 1989
- : lib. bdg. : alk. paper
大学図書館所蔵 全8件
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  佐賀
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注記
Bibliography: p. [339]-349
Includes index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Is judicial review constitutionally required or even authorized? Can it be said whether the federal courts exercise this power with the consent of the electorate? Sosin addresses these challenging questions in the broad context of the Anglo-American historical experience. He examines the evolution of courts of judicature and legislatures and the contests for power that were waged from the seventeenth to eighteenth century.
The origins of the English court system and the establishment of common law are first described. The author traces the rise in judicial and parliamentary power that occurred with the erosion of the royal prerogative and discusses the constitutional and legal heritage that provided the framework for law, courts, and legislatures in colonial America. Following an examination of political, legislative, and legal development during the colonial period, Sosin looks at the philosophical and ideological controversies that influenced the framing of the Constitution, particulary the conflicting views of the proper relationship between the legislature and judiciary. Despite the emphatic opposition voiced by some framers to giving judges the power to overturn legislative action by ruling on the constitutionality of federal laws, the Supreme Court was able to declare itself the final arbiter and ultimate interpreter of the Constitution as early as the first decade of the nineteenth century. The author's analysis indicates that the Court's assumption of the power of judicial review was neither inevitable politically nor the logical result of the founders desire to limit government and protect the rights of individuals against interferences by public authority. Echoing early English and American political figures, Sosin asks whether this expanded, arbitrary judicial power can be considered appropriate in a representative democracy. The product of meticulous research and careful historical analysis, this provocative study will be relevant reading for a variety of courses in American government, political science, and history.
目次
Introduction Institutional Origins of Anglo-American Courts Common Law and Its Early Practitioners Rivals of the Common Law Coke and the Nature of Judicial Power Judges, Parliament, and Royal Prerogative, 1603-1649 Restoration Monarchy and the Judiciary The Glorious Revolution: Constitutional and Legal Heritage During the Age of Colonization Law and Courts in Colonial America: Institutional Framework Review of Colonial Legislation Colonial Lawyers and Judges: The Political Dimension Judicial Tenure, Salaries, and Impeachment: The Colonial Experience Revolutionary Ideology and Constitutions The Judicial Challenge to Legislative Supremacy, 1780-1787 The Federal Constitution Drafted Judicial Review and the Constitution: Analysis and Ratification The Supreme Court of the United States, 1789-1800: Problems and Personnel Federal Judiciary and Party Politics, 1800-1807 Epilogue: Toward "Transcendently Omnipotent" Court Select Bibliography Index
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