The defeat of Che Guevara : military response to guerrilla challenge in Bolivia
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
The defeat of Che Guevara : military response to guerrilla challenge in Bolivia
Praeger, 1990
- Other Title
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Guerrilla inmolada
- Uniform Title
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Guerrilla inmolada
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Library, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization遡
||323.2||P46||10156941
Note
Translation of: La guerrilla inmolada
Includes bibliographical references and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
A thoroughly documented account of the 1967 guerrilla challenge in Bolivia, this volume reconstructs events leading up to, during, and after the defeat of the insurgency. Against the background of the 1960s' attempt to extend Cuban influence throughout Latin America, the book offers an analysis of trends in Bolivian politics from 1952 to 1967. General Prado then evaluates the geographical setting of the insurgency, guerrilla preparations, and the Bolivian response. Prado identifies key strategic errors, including Che Guevara's failure to capture peasant support, and analyzes Che's own theories. Military historians will find no sensational revelations here but, instead, previously unknown details that form a concise reconstruction of The Defeat of Che Guevara.
Recently retired from the Bolivian Army, Prado avoids partisan tones and provides an unusually balanced account of the 1967 guerrilla insurgency in Bolivia. A four-part volume, Part I presents a thorough discussion of the international, national, and military climate. Part II assesses the geographical setting. Part III details operations from preparations to defeat. The volume concludes with a thorough evaluation of the insurgency--causes for its failure, an analysis of Che Guevara's theories, and the Bolivian army's mistakes.
Table of Contents
Illustrations
Foreword by Lawrence H. Hall
Preface
Background
The International Climate
The Domestic Scene
The Military Environment
The Operations Zone
General Description
Other Characteristics of the Region
The Operations
Preparations
Ñancahuazú and Iripití
A Force Divided
Moving North
No Way Out
La Higuera
The End
Evaluation
Some Clarifications
Assessment
Appendix: Impressions and Conversations
Selected English Readings
Index
by "Nielsen BookData"