Optimal contracting between agents with different planning horizons in the presence of information asymmetries

Author(s)

Bibliographic Information

Optimal contracting between agents with different planning horizons in the presence of information asymmetries

Carlos Alberto de Mello-e-Souza

U.M.I.(University Microfilms International) Dissertation information Service, c1989

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Note

Facsim. reprint of the author' thesis(Ph.D.)-- Cornell University, 1989

Photocopy

Details

  • NCID
    BA12393640
  • Country Code
    us
  • Title Language Code
    eng
  • Text Language Code
    eng
  • Place of Publication
    Ann Arbor, Mich.
  • Pages/Volumes
    x, 136 p.
  • Size
    21 cm.
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