The U.S. Constitution and foreign policy : terminating the Taiwan Treaty
著者
書誌事項
The U.S. Constitution and foreign policy : terminating the Taiwan Treaty
(Contributions in political science, no. 270)
Greenwood, 1991
- タイトル別名
-
US Constitution and foreign policy
United States Constitution and foreign policy
大学図書館所蔵 全15件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
  茨城
  栃木
  群馬
  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
  ベルギー
  オランダ
  スウェーデン
  ノルウェー
  アメリカ
注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. [173]-179) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
President Carter's unilateral decision to recognize the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, to end diplomatic relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan, and to terminate the 1954 United States--Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty triggered a classic constitutional separation of powers controversy between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. Victoria Marie Kraft examines the important legal issues and the broader questions of constitutional law and process raised within the context of this controversy. Does the president have the constitutional power to terminate a duly enacted treaty without congressional assent? When is it constitutionally permissible for a president to act unilaterally in foreign affairs? When is congressional consultation required and does the burden of consultation lie with Congress or with the executive branch? The role of the courts in resolving disputes between Congress and the president over the proper constitutional allocation of foreign policy-making power is thoroughly scrutinized as are the long- and short-term effects on foreign policy of confrontational modes of interaction between the president and Congress.
Chapter One traces the history of executive-legislative collaboration on China policy between 1949 and 1976 and underlines the role of Congress in formulating U.S. China policy which later created the legitimate expectation in Congress that active congressional participation in that area would continue. In Chapter Two, the rationale behind Carter's decision and his reasons for making that decision without consulting Congress are considered in depth. The traditional role of the federal courts in resolving foreign-policy making conflicts between Congress and the president is analyzed using Goldwater v. Carter as a starting point in Chapter Three. The last two chapters document the legislative history and constitutional controversy surrounding the Taiwan Relations Act and use the lessons of the China normalization controvercy to develop a useful standard for assessing the constitutional propriety of unilateral foreign policy making by the president. Invaluable supplemental reading for courses in Constitutional Law, Foreign Policy, the Presidency, and American Government, this volume provides a comprehensive understanding of the vital relationships among Congress, the president, the judiciary, and the constitution.
目次
Introduction Congress, the President, and the Making of United States China Policy: 1949-1976 The Carter Years: 1976-1980 Congress Turns to the Courts Congress and the Taiwan Relations Act The Constitution and Foreign Policy: Assessing the Treaty Termination Controversy Bibliography
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