Meaning in mind : Fodor and his critics

書誌事項

Meaning in mind : Fodor and his critics

edited by Barry Loewer and Georges Rey

B. Blackwell, 1991

  • : hard
  • : pbk

タイトル別名

Meaning in mind

この図書・雑誌をさがす
注記

Includes bibliographical references and index

内容説明・目次
巻冊次

: hard ISBN 9780631171034

内容説明

Over the last two decades Jerry Fodor has development and defended an account of intentional mental states and processes which he calls the representational theory of mind. According to this theory, intentional states involve relations to syntactically structured representations in a language of thought, and mental processes are computations over these representations. Recently Fodor has added to this theory what he claims to be a naturalistic account of the semantics of mental representations. "Meaning and Mind" contains a series of perspective, critiques, examinations and explanations of Fodor's work and responses to these by Fodor himself. Each of the contributors holds a position contrary to Fodor's.

目次

  • On the wide and the narrow, Louise Antony, Joseph Levine
  • has content been naturalized?, Lynne Rudder Baker
  • what narrow content is not, Ned Block
  • naturalizing content, Paul Boghossian
  • granny's campaign for safe science, Daniel Dennett
  • why Fodor can't have it both ways, Michael Devitt
  • can we explain intentionality?, Brian Loar
  • can there be vindication without representation?, Robert Matthews
  • speaking up for Darwin, Ruth Millikan
  • Fodor and psychological explanations, John Perry, David Israel
  • how to do semantics for the language of thought, Robert Stalnaker
  • does mentalese have a compositional semantics?, Stephen Schiffer
  • connectionism, constituency, and the language of thought, Paul Smolensky
  • narrow content meets fat syntax, Stephen Stich
  • responses, Jerry Fodor
巻冊次

: pbk ISBN 9780631187011

内容説明

Even in the eyes of many of his critics, Fodor is widely regarded as the most important philosopher of psychology of his generation. With Noam Chomsky at MIT in the 1960s he mounted a strenuous attack on the behaviourism that then dominated psychology and most philosophy of mind, and since then, he has articulated and defended in considerable richness and detail a computational theory of intentional causation that is central to the emerging cognitive sciences. This theory provides a framework both for the resolution of many traditional problems in the philosophy of mind and language, and for actual psychological research and experimentation. The present volume contains 16 contributions by philosophers and cognitive scientists who have been critical of this theory, followed by replies Fodor makes to each of them. There is alos a lengthy introduction that provides an overview of Fodor's views and their relation to this critical discussion.

目次

  • On the wide and narrow, Louise Antony and Joseph Levine
  • has content been naturalized, Lynne Rudder Baker
  • what narrow content is not, Ned Block
  • naturalizing content, Paul Boghossian
  • granny's campaign for safe science, Daniel Dennett
  • why Fodor can't have it both ways, Michael Devitt
  • can we explain intentionality?, Brian Loar
  • can there be vindication without representation?, Robert Matthews
  • speaking up for Darwin, Ruth Millikan
  • Fodor and psychological explanations, John Perry and David Israel
  • how to do semantics for the language of thought, Robert Stalnaker
  • does mentalese have a conpositional semantics?, Stephen Schiffer
  • connectionism, constituency, and the language of thought, Paul Smolensky
  • narrow content meets fat syntax, Stephen Stich
  • responses, Jerry Fodor.

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