Unholy grail : the US and the wars in Vietnam, 1965-8
著者
書誌事項
Unholy grail : the US and the wars in Vietnam, 1965-8
(The operational level of war)
Routledge, 1991
大学図書館所蔵 全18件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
  茨城
  栃木
  群馬
  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
  ベルギー
  オランダ
  スウェーデン
  ノルウェー
  アメリカ
注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
The aim of "Unholy Grail" is to examine and explain the failures which caused the American defeat in Vietnam. Based on primary sources, including the recently declassified holdings of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Archive, the work focuses upon the formulation, execution and assessments of American policy in Vietnam between the troop deployment decision of July 1965, and President Johnson's speech of 31st March 1968. While there are few heroes and several villains, it was the shared intellectual heritage of the war's planners and managers which ensured the America's failure. As Larry Cable argues, the United States was not so much out-fought by the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, as out-thought. The intellectual errors were compounded by a pervasive inability on the part of the military high command and the administration to accept the intelligence reports which repeatedly portrayed the failure of key elements of American strategy, particularly with respect to the air campaign in North Vietnam. This book should be of interest to students and lecturers in military history.
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