The Canadian Army and the Normandy campaign : a study of failure in high command
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
The Canadian Army and the Normandy campaign : a study of failure in high command
Praeger, 1991
Available at 1 libraries
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  Saitama
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  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
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  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
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  United States of America
Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. [333]-337) and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
The reverses experienced by Canadian troops during the late stages of World War II continue to be the subject of intensive inquiry among military historians. Going beyond the obvious immediate causes of these setbacks, the author presents a detailed historical examination of the role of the Canadian army in Normandy and of the organization, training, and fighting-style that the Canadians brought to the battlefield in 1944.
In Book I, the author analyzes the impact of the British military model on the Canadian corps in terms of doctrine, training, command and staff appointments, equipment, and organization. He discusses the contribution of Canadian troops in World War I and the failure of the Canadian military to maintain a high level of professionalism in the interwar period. Drawing on archival records, particularly Montgomery's personal correspondence, the author offers new information on attempts to turn Canadian troops into an effective fighting force as late as 1943. Book II presents a critical analysis of Canadian operations in Normandy. The author gives special attention to the Canadian Army's inability to close the Falaise Gap in a timely manner--a delay that may have prolonged the war in Europe by several months. Providing both theoretical and practical perspectives on the relationship of peacetime preparation to the operation of large field forces in battle, this work will be of interest to students and buffs of military history and to professional analysts and strategic planners in the armed services.
Table of Contents
Foreword by Gunther E. Rothenberg
Preface
Prologue: Of Ignorant Armies
Long Forgotten Winters
The Canadian Corps and the British Mold
The Bellows of Peace
Shaping an Expeditionary Force
The Staff Caste
Battle Drill Die
The Montgomery Measurement
Epilogue: Final Tempering
Half-Forgotten Summer
The Imprint of Doctrine
Cast of Commanders
Throes Beyond the Beach
Cold Eye on Death
The Amiens Alchemy
Case Hardening
Conclusion: Final Casting
Appendix A: Some General Notes on What to Look for When Visiting a Regiment by Lt.-Col. B. L. Montgomery
Appendix B: Tank and Gun Comparisons
Select Bibliography
Index
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