The Tet Offensive : intelligence failure in war
著者
書誌事項
The Tet Offensive : intelligence failure in war
（Cornell studies in security affairs / edited by Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis, and Stephen M. Walt）
Cornell University Press, 1991
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注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
In this account of one of the worst intelligence failures in American
history, James J. Wirtz explains why U.S. forces were surprised by the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive in 1968. Wirtz reconstructs the turning point of the Vietnam War in unprecedented detail. Drawing upon Vietcong and recently declassified U.S. sources, he is able to trace the strategy and unfolding of the Tet campaign as well as the U.S. response.
目次
IntroductionPART I: "THE BIG VICTORY, THE GREAT TASK"
1. The Communist Debate over Strategy
2. Preparations, and Objectives of the Tet OffensivePART II: THE ORIGINS OF SURPRISE
3. The Sources of American Biases
4. Missing the Signals: July-November 1967
5. Missing the Signals: December 1967-30 January 1968
6. Reacting to the Tet OffensiveConclusion: Explaining the Failure of IntelligenceBibliography
Index
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