Indivisible selves & moral practice

著者

書誌事項

Indivisible selves & moral practice

Vinit Haksar

Barnes & Noble Books , Edinburgh University Press, 1991

  • Edinburgh Press
  • uk : pbk

タイトル別名

Indivisible selves and moral practice

大学図書館所蔵 件 / 全6件

この図書・雑誌をさがす

注記

Includes bibliographical references and index

内容説明・目次

巻冊次

Edinburgh Press ISBN 9780748602490

内容説明

Ever since David Parfit published his "Reasons and Persons" in 1985, there has been intense debate in philosophical psychology about the status of intellectual thought-experiments - "what would we say if?". Directly countering Parfit's view that our moral life must be tailored to our speculation about the mind, the author argues in this new book that presuppositions in our moral and practical life should have a bearing on what we believe about persons and personal identity. He defends the indivisible self view, using a detailed examination of the empirical evidence arising from split-brain and multiple-personality cases. He outlines the moral, social, legal and practical implications of the different views of the self (and non-self), and deals extensively with suffering, individual persons and groups. A new contribution to the nature of the self, this book uses moral philosophy to tackle the problems of personal identity. It is aimed at advanced undergraduate and graduate students and teachers of philosophy of mind and moral philosophy, theology, psychology and law.

目次

  • Persons and personal identity
  • consciousness and its importance
  • scepticism and practical life
  • gambling in the dark and reflective equilibrium
  • split brains
  • multiplie personality
  • non-reductionism and the use of imaginary examples
  • egoistical concern without an ego
  • persons, justice and desert.
巻冊次

uk : pbk ISBN 9780748602605

内容説明

Ever since David Parfit published his "Reasons and Persons" in 1985, there has been intense debate in philosophical psychology about the status of intellectual thought-experiments - "what would we say if?". Directly countering Parfit's view that our moral life must be tailored to our speculation about the mind, the author argues in this new book that presuppositions in our moral and practical life should have a bearing on what we believe about persons and personal identity. He defends the indivisible self view, using a detailed examination of the empirical evidence arising from split-brain and multiple-personality cases. He outlines the moral, social, legal and practical implications of the different views of the self (and non-self), and deals extensively with suffering, individual persons and groups. A new contribution to the nature of the self, this book uses moral philosophy to tackle the problems of personal identity. It is aimed at advanced undergraduate and graduate students and teachers of philosophy of mind and moral philosophy, theology, psychology and law.

目次

  • Persons and personal identity
  • consciousness and its importance
  • scepticism and practical life
  • gambling in the dark and reflective equilibrium
  • split brains
  • multiplie personality
  • non-reductionism and the use of imaginary examples
  • egoistical concern without an ego
  • persons, justice and dessert.

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