The economics of oligopolistic competition : price and nonprice rivalry : collected papers of Robert E. Kuenne
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
The economics of oligopolistic competition : price and nonprice rivalry : collected papers of Robert E. Kuenne
（Advances in theoretical and applied economics）
Blackwell, 1992
Available at 65 libraries
Note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
Professor Kuenne is a leading authority in the field of economic theory, having made significant contributions to the fields of general equilibrium theory, industrial organization and regional science. This volume focuses on the development and exposition of a new theory of oligopoly which is asserted to have certain advantages over game theoretic approaches. It is designed to be opertional, to be capable of fitting within general equilibrium frameworks, to permit multiobjective optimization by firms, and to be soluble by nonlinear programming techniques. Most importantly, Professor Kuenne develops themes concerning the need to incorporate within oligopoly a blending of the cooperative and competitive that typifies the price strategies of oligopolists within most industries with small numbers of competitors. Unlike game theory, this approach permits analysis of the peculiar socioeconomic power structure that develops within oligopolies and constrains membersa decision--making freedom. This power structure can be derived exogenously or endogenously in the modelling.
The theory is developed fully with extensive empirical application, particularly to decision making within the OPEC petroleum cartel in the 1970s.
Table of Contents
Part I - Rivalrous Consonance Theory 1. Toward a Usable General Theory of Oligopoly. 2. Towards an Operational General Equilibrium. 3. General Oligopolistic Equilibrium: A Crippled-Optimization Approach. 4. Duopoly Reaction Functions under Crippled Optimization Regimes. 5. Rivalrous Consonance: A Theory of Mature Oligopolistic Behavior in a General Equilibrium Framework. Part II - Price Competition in Oligopoly: The Case of OPEC 6. Rivalrous Consonance and the Power Structure of OPEC. 7. A Short-Run Demand Analysis of the OPEC Cartel. 8. The Limits of OPEC. 9. The GENESYS Model of OPEC, 1974-80. 10. Lessons and Conjectures on OPEC. Part III - Non-Price Competition in Oligopoly. 11. Quality Space, Interproduct Competition, and General Equilibrium Theory. 12. Interproduct Distances in a Quality-Space: Inexact Measurement in Differentiated Oligopoly Analysis. 13. Price-Quality Competition in Oligopolistic Interdependence. 14. Price/Marketing Competition and Information Flows in Spatial Oligopoly. 15. Spatial Oligopoly: Price-Location Interdependence. 16. The Dynamics of Oligopolistic Location: Present Status and Future Research Directions. 17. Modelling Price and Non-Price Competition in Spatial Oligopoly. Part IV - Oligopolistic Decision Making Under Uncertainty. 18. Oligopolistic Uncertainty and Optimal Bidding in Government Procurement. 19. Uncertainty, Spatial Proximity, and the Stability of Oligopoly Pricing. 20. Conflict Management and the Theory of Mature Oligopoly.
by "Nielsen BookData"