Recent developments in game theory
著者
書誌事項
Recent developments in game theory
E. Elgar, c1992
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注記
Includes bibliographical references
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Few fields in economics have experienced such a rapid growth in recent years as game theory. Game theoretic methods have found applications in many fields of economics, ranging from industrial organization to the theory of market transactions. Beginning with a review of the developments of game theoretic concepts during the last decade, this distinguished book evaluates the most recent research on bounded rationality and automata, on signalling games and on the role of learning in game theory. It also presents material on major applications including market institutions and optimal contract forms under asymmetric information, the implications of strategic information transmission, and evolutionary game theory with its potential to overcome the famous prisoners' dilemma problem. Focusing on issues at the forefront of the most recent developments in economics, the book will be of interest to students and researchers working in the fast developing field of game theory.
目次
Contents: 1. Subgame Perfection (L. Samuelson) 2. Repeated Games and Finite Automata (R. Marks) 3. Signalling Games (G.J. Mailath) 4. Nash Equilibrium and Learning (J. Eichberger) 5. Modelling Transactions under Asymmetric Information (R.P. McAfee and J. McMillan) 6. Multiple-Agent Models (J. Borland) 7. Evolutionary Game Theory (A.J. Robson) 8. Endogenous Learning (L.J. Mirman)
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