Law and economics
著者
書誌事項
Law and economics
(The international library of essays in law and legal theory, . Schools ; 3)
Dartmouth, c1992
- v. 1
- v. 2
大学図書館所蔵 全71件
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注記
Includes bibliographical references and indexes
内容説明・目次
内容説明
This two-volume set on law and economics contains chapters on fundamental concepts in law and economics, economic analysis of tort, contract and property law. Volume two discusses the common law process, economic analysis of the corporation and collective choice and the law.
目次
- Volume 1: Part 1 Fundamental concepts in law and economics: the problem of social cost, Coase
- property rules, liability rules and inalienability - one view of the Cathedral, Calabresi and Melamed
- prices and sanctions, Cootar. Part 2 Economic analysis of tort law: toward a test for strict liability in torts, Calabresi and Hirschoff
- toward an economic theory of liability, Brown
- some effects of uncertainty on compliance with legal standards, Calfee and Craseell. Part 3 Economic analysis of contract law: enforcing promises - an examination of the basis of contract, Goetz and Scott
- risk sharing through breach of contract remedies, Polinsky
- transaction-cost economics - the governance of contractual relations, Williamson. Part 4 Economic analysis of property law: toward a theory of property rights, Demsetz
- of Coase and cattle - dispute resolution among neighbours in Shasta County, Ellickson
- inalienability and the theory of property rights, Rose-Ackerman. Part 5 Economic analysis of crime: criminal law and the optimal use of non-monetary sanctions as a deterrent
- on the economic theory of crime, Klevorick. Volume 2: Part 1 Economic analysis of the common law process: why is the common law efficient?, Rubin
- can litigation improve the law without the help of judges, Cooter and Kornhauser
- the selection of disputes for litigation, Priest and Klein. Part 2 Economic analysis of the corporation: ownership of the firm, Hansmann
- theory of the firm - managerial behaviour, agency costs and ownership structures, Jensen and Meckling
- limited liability and the corporation, Easterbrook and Fischel. Part 3 Collective choice and the law: constitutional deregulation - notes toward a public choice theory for statutory interpretation, Eskridge
- ways of criticizing the court, Easterbrook. Part 4 Applications of game theory to the law: bargaining in the shadow of the law - a testable model of strategic behaviour, Cooter, Marks and Mnookin
- the tax compliance game - toward an interactive theory of law enforcement, Gratez, Reinganum and Wilde. Part 5 Philosophical foundations of law and economics: efficiency, utility and wealth maximization, Coleman
- utilitarianism, economics and legal theory, Posner
- is wealth a value?, Dworkin.
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