Probability and evidence
著者
書誌事項
Probability and evidence
（Cambridge studies in philosophy / general editor, Ernest Sosa）
Cambridge University Press, 1982
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注記
Bibliography: p. 143-144
Includes index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
In this volume, which was originally published in 1982, Paul Horwich presents a clear and unified approach to a number of problems in the philosophy of science. He diagnoses the failure of other attempts to resolve them as stemming from a too-rigid, all-or-nothing conception of belief, and adopts instead a Bayesian strategy, emphasising the degree of confidence to which we are entitled the light of scientific evidence. This probabilistic approach, he argues, yields a more complete understanding of the assumptions and procedures characteristic of scientific reasoning. It also accounts for the merits of simplicity, severe tests and surprising predictions, and provides a way in which the dispute between the realist and instrumentalist views of science might be resolved. The result is a crisp, well-focused contribution to the philosophy of science. The elaboration of an important conception of probability will stimulate anyone with an interest in the field.
目次
- Preface
- Part I. Methodology: 1. Introduction
- 2. Aspects of the scientific method
- 3. A taste of Bayesianism
- Part II. Probability: 4. The primitive theory
- 5. Subjectivism
- 6. The rationalist interpretation
- 7. The logical interpretation
- 8. The evidential state
- 9. The empirical interpretation
- Part III. Confirmation: 10. Explications
- 11. The paradox
- 12. A Bayesian pseudo-solution to the problem of induction
- 13. Projection
- Part IV. Induction
- Section 1. The Nature of Inductive Inference
- Section 2. Conditions of Rationality: 14. Demonstrable reliability
- 15. The demonstrable reliability of c+
- 16. Immodesty
- 17. Audacity
- Section 3. The Justification of Induction: 18. The impossibility of a noncircular rationale
- 19. Inductive demonstration of reliability
- 20. Semantic justification
- Part V. Prediction: 21. Surprise
- 22. Severe tests
- 23. Ad hoc hypothesis
- 24. Prediction versus accommodation
- Part VI. Evidence: 25. The evidential value of varied data
- 26. The value of further data
- Part VII. Realism: 27. Popper
- 28. Realism versus instrumentalism
- 29. Putnam
- 30. Glymour
- 31. Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index.
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