Managerial dilemmas : the political economy of hierarchy
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Managerial dilemmas : the political economy of hierarchy
(Political economy of institutions and decisions)
Cambridge University Press, 1992
- : hard
- : pbk
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Available at 50 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
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  United States of America
Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. 239-245) and indexes
Description and Table of Contents
Description
In organisation theory a schism has developed between the traditional organisational behaviour literature, based in psychology, sociology and political science, and the more analytically rigorous field of organisational economics. The former stresses the importance of managerial leadership and cooperation among employees, while the latter focuses on the engineering of incentive systems that will induce efficiency and profitability, by rewarding worker self-interest. In this innovative book, Gary Miller bridges the gap between these literatures. He demonstrates that it is impossible to design an incentive system based on self-interest that will effectively discipline all subordinates and superiors and obviate or overcome the roles of political conflict, collective action, and leadership in an organisation. Applying game theory to the analysis of the roles of cooperation and political leadership in organisational hierarchies, he concludes that the organisation whose managers can inspire cooperation and the transcendence of short-term interest in its employees enjoys a competitive advantage.
Table of Contents
- List of tables and figures
- Series editors' preface
- Acknowledgements
- Part I. Why Have Hierarchy?: 1. Market failures and hierarchical solutions: the tension between individual and social rationality
- 2. Bargaining failure: coordination, bargaining, and contracts
- 3. Voting failure: social choice in a dictatorial hierarchy
- Part II. Managerial Dilemmas: 4. Horizontal dilemmas: social choice in a decentralised hierarchy
- 5. Vertical dilemmas: piece-rate incentives and credible commitments
- 6. Hidden action in hierarchies: principals, agents, and teams
- 7. Hidden information in hierarchies: the logical limits of mechanism design
- 8. Hierarchical failures and market solutions: can competition create efficient incentives for managers? Part III. Cooperation and Leadership: 9. The possibilities of cooperation: repeated vertical dilemmas
- 10. The indeterminacy of cooperation: conventions, culture, and commitments
- 11. The political economy of hierarchy: commitment, leadership and property rights
- Epilogue: politics, rationality, and efficiency
- References
- Name index
- Subject index.
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