Economic analysis of markets and games : essays in honor of Frank Hahn
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書誌事項
Economic analysis of markets and games : essays in honor of Frank Hahn
MIT Press, c1992
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注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
These original essays focus on a wide range of topics related to Frank Hahn's distinguished work in economics, ranging from market analysis and game theory to the microeconomic foundations of macroeconomics and from equilibrium and optimality with missing markets to economics and society, they reflect the diversity of modern research in economic theory. What distinguishes Hahn's work and many of the essays in this book is that the motivation often comes from practical concerns about unemployment, savings and investment, poverty, or the stability of markets. The essays in Part I deal with the microeconomic foundations of macroeconomics - a field in which Hahn has made important contributions, most notably in the theory of monetary economics. Topics include an evaluation of Hahn's contribution to the theory of distribution and such macroeconomic themes as coordination failure, multiple equilibria, and strategic issues. Part II contains recent contributions to game theory reflecting Hahn's interest in the question of what is rational behaviour. The essays in Part III concentrate on general-equilibrium theory with missing markets, a field in which Hahn has made major advances.
Although the essays address a different set of issues, they share with Hahn's works such themes as market failure, indeterminacy of equilibrium, and the role of money.
目次
- Part 1 Microeconomic foundations of macroeconomics: Hahn on the share of wages in National Income, Robert M. Solow
- nominal-wage setting and the theory of games, Christopher Bliss
- underemployment as a co-ordination problem with savings and increasing returns, Walter P. Heller
- properties of aggregate saving in overlapping-generations models, David A. Starrett
- institutional features of unemployment insurance and the working of the labor market, Anthony Barnes Atkinson
- production fluctuations and fiscal policy in an economy with aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, Oliver Hart and Eric Maskin
- prices and queues as screening devices in competitive markets, Joseph E. Stiglitz. Part 2 Information and the theory of games: informational equivalence of signals, Kenneth J. Arrow
- informational efficiency of search equilibrium, Douglas Gale
- irrationality in game theory, Robert J. Aumann
- rational conjectural equilibrium and repeated games, Hamid Sabourian
- static choice in the presence of unforeseen contingencies, David M. Kreps
- lexicographic probabilities and iterated admissibility, Adam Brandenburger
- understanding the past in order to assess the future - on learning equilibrium price processes, Mordecai Kurz
- transfer payments and the core of a profit-center game, Roy Radner
- credible oil supply contracts, David M. Newbery
- the existence of perfectly competitive equilibrium a la Wicksteed, Louis Makowski and Joseph M. Ostroy. Part 3 Optimality and equilibrium with missing markets: the value of money in a finite-horizon economy - a role for banks, Pradeep Dubey and John Geanakoplos
- the Lucas equation, indeterminancy, and non-neutrality - an example, Pierre-Andre Chiappori and Rober Guesnerie
- three observations on sunspots and asset redundancy, Andreu Mas-Colell
- on the aggregate effects of individual risks, Jayasri Dutta and Heraklis Polemarchakis
- the optimum quantity of money revisited, Timothy J. Kehoe, et al
- on the impossibility of perfect capital markets, Peter J. Hammond
- optimal taxation of identical consumers when markets are incomplete, Peter A. Diamond and James A. Mirrlees. Part 4 Miscellany: educating our masters, Terence Gorman
- risk tolerances, distributive inequality and track bettors' equilibrium, Paul A. Samuelson
- poverty and living standards, Partha Dasgupta.
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