Realism and truth

書誌事項

Realism and truth

Michael Devitt

B. Blackwell, 1991

2nd ed

大学図書館所蔵 件 / 9

この図書・雑誌をさがす

注記

Includes bibliographical references (p. [304]-318) and index

内容説明・目次

内容説明

What is realism about the external world? A striking aspect of the current debate is the lack of a clear answer to this metaphysical question. The question is commonly conflated with a semantic question about truth. The book sharply distinguishes these questions and argues, from a naturalistic perspective, that the metaphysical one is prior. It advocates a thorough-going realism about the common-sense and scientific physical world. From this basis, it puts forward a correspondence notion of truth, explained in terms of reference, which is in turn explained by a causal theory. It criticizes relativist and constructionist views held by Kuhn and many others (structuralists and post-structuralists). It has detailed criticisms of van Fraassen, Davidson, Rorty, Putnam, Dummett, and others. This new edition has been thoroughly revised and includes a new chapter on Rorty; an expanded discussion on relativism and Kantian constructionism, and truth; and a defence of the role of inference to the best explanation in arguing for realism.

目次

  • Part 1 Introduction. Part 2 Proposals: what is realism?
  • what is truth?
  • what has truth to do with realism?
  • why be a commonsense realist?
  • why do we need truth?
  • why be a scientific realist?. Part 3 Polemics: Van Fraasen against scientific realism
  • Kuhn, Feyerabend and radical philosophers of science
  • Davidsonians agianst reference
  • Rorty's mirrorless world
  • the renegade Putnam
  • constructivism and independence
  • Dummett's anti-realism. Part 4 Conclusions. Appendix: list of named maxims and doctrines.

「Nielsen BookData」 より

詳細情報

  • NII書誌ID(NCID)
    BA1823960X
  • ISBN
    • 0631175512
  • LCCN
    91003062
  • 出版国コード
    uk
  • タイトル言語コード
    eng
  • 本文言語コード
    eng
  • 出版地
    Oxford, UK ; Cambridge, Mass., USA
  • ページ数/冊数
    xii, 327 p.
  • 大きさ
    23 cm
  • 分類
  • 件名
ページトップへ