Reduction, explanation, and realism
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Reduction, explanation, and realism
Clarendon , Oxford University Press, 1992
- : pbk
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Note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Description and Table of Contents
- Volume
-
ISBN 9780198242734
Description
What is reduction? Must all discussions of the mind, value, colour, biological organisms, and persons aim to reduce these to objects and properties that can be studied by more basic, physical science? Conversely, does failure to achieve a reduction undermine the legitimacy of higher levels of description or explanation? In recent years philosophers have attempted to avoid these traditional alternatives by developing an account of higher-level phenomena which shows
them to be grounded in, but not reducible to, basic physical objects and properties. The contributors to this volume examine the motivations for such anti-reductionist views, and assess their coherence and success, in a number of different fields. Their essays constitute a unified discussion, into
which the reader is led by an introductory chapter where the editors set out some of the central claims and questions.
Table of Contents
- Modest reductions and the unity of science, Pete Smith
- irreducibility and teleology, David Papineau
- reduction and evolutionary biology, Graham MacDonald
- structural explanation in social theory, Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit
- weak externalism and psychological reduction, Cynthia MacDonals
- physics, biology, and common-sense psychology, Jennifer Hornsby
- the limitations of pluralism, Adrian Cussins
- reduction, causality and normativity, Kathleen Lennon
- anti-reductionism without pain?, Brian Loar
- supervenience, composition, and physicalism, David charles
- values - reduction, supervenience, and explanation by ascent, James Griffin
- valuing - desiring or believing?, Michael Smith
- reductionism and first-person thinking, Quassim Cassam
- the reductionist view of the self, John Campbell
- the authonomy of colour, Justin Broackes.
- Volume
-
: pbk ISBN 9780198751311
Description
What is reduction? Must all discussions of the mind, value, colour, biological organisms, and persons aim to reduce these to objects and properties that can be studied by more basic, physical science? Conversely, does failure to achieve a reduction undermine the legitimacy of higher levels of description or explanation? In recent years philosophers have attempted to avoid these traditional alternatives by developing an account of higher-level phenomena which shows them to be grounded in, but not reducible to, basic physical objects and properties. The contributors to this volume examine the motivations for such anti-reductionist views, and assess their coherence and success, in a number of different fields. Their essays constitute a unified discussion, into which the reader is led by an introductory chapter where the editors set out some of the central claims and questions.
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