Open skies : Eisenhower's proposal of July 21, 1955
著者
書誌事項
Open skies : Eisenhower's proposal of July 21, 1955
（Ideas and action series, no. 4）
University of Texas Press, 1982
1st ed
- : pbk
大学図書館所蔵 件 / 全13件
-
該当する所蔵館はありません
- すべての絞り込み条件を解除する
注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
In 1955 the United States and the Soviet Union were matching steps in a race to develop missiles tipped with thermonuclear weapons. American officials were frustrated and alarmed by their inability to learn the scale and progress of the Soviet program, which directly threatened the security of the United States, and they were convinced that serious arms control measures required reliable means for mutual inspection. The result: President Dwight D. Eisenhower's dramatic Open Skies proposal, advanced-and rejected-at the Geneva summit of 1955.
Vetoed by Nikita Khrushchev, Eisenhower's proposal to allow mutual aerial inspection between the United States and the U.S.S.R. was accepted as policy only after satellite photography became feasible. But at the time of the 1955 summit, it was a stunning, if transient, psychological and political victory for the United States and its president.
W. W. Rostow was an active participant in this important episode in American history, and his is the first authoritative account of how Eisenhower's Open Skies proposal came to be. His insider's knowledge, combined with data from hitherto unexploited documentary sources, vividly brings to life the discussions and events that preceded the president's proposal.
Rostow explores the diplomatic forces that led to Eisenhower's reluctant acceptance of a summit with the Soviets. He tracks the origins of the Open Skies concept to an obscure meeting organized at Quantico Marine Corps Base by presidential adviser Nelson Rockefeller. He describes the tensions between Rockefeller and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that complicated Eisenhower's task in mounting the initiative for Open Skies and explains the differences between Eisenhower himself and Rockefeller over postsummit policy that provoked the latter's resignation. He examines Soviet motives and objectives at Geneva. Finally, Rostow reflects on the meaning of this fascinating episode in American history, in particular its importance to later arms control negotiations.
目次
Preface
1. The Decision
2. Three Roads to Geneva: From Moscow, Western Europe, and Washington
3. The Quantico Panel, June 5-10, 1955
4. From Quantico to Geneva: June 10 to July 21, 1955
5. The Aftermath
6. Some Reflections
Appendixes
A. Documents Bearing on the 6:00 P.M. July 20, 1955, Meeting
8. Notes on the Eisenhower-Eden Meeting, Breakfast, July 20, 1955
C. Soviet Inspection Proposals of May 10, 1955, and the Initial U.S. Reaction
D. Jackson's Account of the Evolution of the Open Skies Proposal
E. Ted Parker's Assembly of Documents on the Evolution of the Open Skies Proposal
F. Ellis Johnson's Analysis of Narrowing U.S.-Soviet Military Capabilities
G. Post-Quantico Letter to Rockefeller from the Author, June 17, 1955
H. Jackson's Account of Dinner with Dulles on the Eve of His Departure for Geneva and Dulles' Response
I. Jackson's Letters to Eisenhower and Dulles on the Quantico Report
J. Dulles' Suggestions for Eisenhower's Presummit Talk to the American People
K. Two Presummit Speech Drafts Submitted to Eisenhower by Rockefeller
L. Postsummit Stassen Letter to Rockefeller
M. State Department Position Papers on the Summit
Notes
Index
「Nielsen BookData」 より