Bargaining with incomplete information
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Bargaining with incomplete information
(Economic theory, econometrics, and mathematical economics)
Academic Press, c1992
Available at 33 libraries
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Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration (RIEB) Library , Kobe University図書
301.18-15081000087356
Note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
This book is a reprinting of the June 1989 issue of the "Journal of Economic Theory". Ten additional papers have been included to expand coverage of current research and provide a convenient source for classic articles. Together these 22 contributions to the economic theory of non-co-operative bargaining show how incomplete information, small numbers of agents, and the rules governing negotiation interact to cause inefficiency, indeterminacy, and delay in bargaining outcomes.
Table of Contents
- Bargaining under incomplete information, K. Chatterjee and W. Samuelson
- efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading, R. Myerson and M.A. Satterthwaite
- ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade, T. Gresik
- the efficiency of linear equilibria of sealed-bid double auctions, T. Gresik
- equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information, W. Leininger, et al
- bilateral trade with the sealed-bid k-double auction - existence and efficiency, M.A. Satterthwaite and S. Williams
- the bilateral monopoly model - approaching certainty under the split-the-difference mechanism, E. Broman
- the sealed-bid mechanism - an experimental study, R. Radner and A. Schotter
- minimax-regret strategies for bargaining over several variables, P.B. Linhart and R. Radner
- a bargaining model with incomplete information about time preferences, A. Rubinstein
- foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture, F. Gul, et al
- reputation in bargaining and durable goods monopoly, L. Ausubel and R. Deneckere
- strategic delay in bargaining, A. Admati and M. Perry
- a direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one-sided incomplete information, L. Ausubel and R. Deneckere
- bargaining with common values, D. Vincent
- cheap talk can matter in bargaining, J. Farrell and R. Gibbons
- pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions, S. Matthews and A. Postlewaite
- credible negotiation statements and coherent plans, R. Myerson
- the rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases - an asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms, T. Gresik and M.A. Satterthwaite
- the rate of convergence to efficiency in the buyer's bid double auction as the market becomes large, M.A. Satterthwaite and S. Williams
- pollution claim settlements under private information, R. Rob.
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