An essay on belief and acceptance
著者
書誌事項
An essay on belief and acceptance
Clarendon Press , Oxford University Press, 1992
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注記
Includes index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
In this incisive new monograph one of Britain's most eminent philosophers explores the often overlooked tension between voluntariness and involuntariness in human cognition. He seeks to counter the widespread tendency for analytic epistemology to be dominated by the concept of belief.
Is scientific knowledge properly conceived as being embodied, at its best, in a passive feeling of belief or in an active policy of acceptance? Should a jury's verdict declare what its members involuntarily believe or what they voluntarily accept? And should statements and assertions be presumed to express what their authors believe or what they accept? Does such a distinction between belief and acceptance help to resolve the paradoxes of self-deception and akrasia? Must people be
taken to believe everything entailed by what they believe, or merely to accept everything entailed by what they accept?
Through a systematic examination of these problems, the author sheds new light on issues of crucial importance in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science.
目次
- What is the difference?
- Purposive explanation
- What cognitive state does indicative speech express?
- Does knowledge imply belief or acceptance?
- Self-deceit and the Socratic paradox
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