Game-theoretic models of cooperation and conflict

著者

• Mayberry, John P.
• Harsanyi, John C.
• Scarf, Herbert E.
• Selten, Reinhard

書誌事項

Game-theoretic models of cooperation and conflict

John P. Mayberry, with John C. Harsanyi, Herbert E. Scarf, and Reinhard Selten

（Underground classics in economics）

Westview Press, 1992

注記

Papers originally issued 1965-1968

Includes bibliographical references

内容説明・目次

内容説明

Consists of previously unpublished papers from the history of the development of game theory. Commissioned for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the late 1960s, these papers, all by game theorists, marked great advances in bargaining theory, repeated games with incomplete information and proliferation models with special applications to arms control.

目次

• Generalized rash solution for two-person bargaining games with incomplete foundation, John C. Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten
• applications of bargaining I-games to Cold war competition, R. Selten and J.P. Mayberry
• on the existance of cooperative solutions to a class of N-person games, Herbert E. Scarf
• the variety of Nash bargaining solutions to 2 x 2 cardinal games, J.P. Mayberry.

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詳細情報

• NII書誌ID(NCID): BA18869798
• ISBN:
  • 0813315247
• LCCN: 92031019
• 出版国コード: us
• タイトル言語コード: eng
• 本文言語コード: eng
• 出版地: Boulder, Colo.
• ページ数/冊数: ix, 212 p.
• 大きさ: 23 cm
• 分類:
  • NDC8 : 417.2
  • LCC : QA269
  • DC20 : 519.3
• 件名:
  • LCSH : Game theory
• 親書誌ID:
  • BA03578521