Wise Choices, Apt Feelings : a theory of Normative Judgment
著者
書誌事項
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings : a theory of Normative Judgment
（Clarendon paperbacks）
Oxford University Press, 1992
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注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
`Choices can be wise or foolish, and feelings can be apt or off the mark.' Since this is how we judge, it would be good to know what content these normative judgements carry. Gibbard offers an answer, and elaborates it. His theory explores what is at issue in narrowly moral questions, and in questions of rational thought and conduct in general. It helps to explain why normative thought and talk so pervade human life, and why our highly social species might have
evolved to be gripped by these questions. Gibbard asks how, if his theory is right, we can interpret our normative puzzles, and thus proceed toward finding answers to them.
Not available from OUP in the USA, Canada, Japan or the Phillippines.
目次
- I. Analyses: 1. The puzzle
- 2. Nature and judgment
- 3. Analyses broached
- 4. Normative psychology
- 5. Normative logic
- II. Psyche in nature: 6. Natural representation
- 7. Moral emotions
- III. Normative objectivity: 8. Objectivity: first steps
- 9. Normative authority
- 10. Parochial judgment
- 11. Rationale and warrant
- 12. Pragmatic support
- 13. Communities of judgment
- IV. Moral inquiry: 14. Moral concern
- 5. Assessing feelings
- 16. Structural questions
- 17. Moral system
- References
- Index
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