Rules, reputation and macroeconomic policy coordination
著者
書誌事項
Rules, reputation and macroeconomic policy coordination
Cambridge University Press, c1993
大学図書館所蔵 全46件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
  茨城
  栃木
  群馬
  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
  ベルギー
  オランダ
  スウェーデン
  ノルウェー
  アメリカ
注記
Includes bibliogrpahy (p. 407-419) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
In this book David Currie and Paul Levine address a broad range of issues concerning the design and conduct of macroeconomic policy in open economies. Adopting neo-Keynesian models for which monetary and fiscal policy have short-term real effects, they analyse active stabilisation policies in both a single- and multi-country context. Questions addressed include: the merits of simple policy rules, policy design in the face of uncertainty and international policy coordination. A central feature of the book is the treatment of credibility and the effect of a policy-maker's reputation for sticking to announced policies. These considerations are integrated with coordination issues to produce a unique synthesis. The volume develops optimal control methods and dynamic game theory to handle relationships between governments and a conscious rational private sector and produces a unified, coherent approach to the subject. This book will be of interest to students and teachers of open economy macroeconomics and to professional economists interested in using macroeconomic models to design policy.
目次
- Introduction
- Part I. General Issues: 1. Macroeconomic policy design and control theory - a failed partnership?
- 2. International policy coordination - a survey
- 3. The European road to monetary union
- Part II. Theory and Methodology: 4. The design of feedback rules in linear stochastic rational expectations models
- 5. Credibility and time consistency in a stochastic world
- 6. Should rules be simple?
- 7. Macroeconomic policy design using large econometric rational expectations models
- Part III. Fiscal and monetary policy in interdependent economies: 8. Macroeconomic policy design in an interdependent world
- 9. Does international macroeconomic policy coordination pay and is it sustainable?: a two-country analysis
- 10. International cooperation and reputation in an empirical two-bloc model
- 11. Fiscal policy coordination, inflation and reputation in a natural rate world
- 12. The use of simple rules for international policy coordination
- 13. Evaluating the extended target zone proposal for the G3
- Bibliography
- Index.
「Nielsen BookData」 より