Existentialist critiques of Cartesianism

書誌事項

Existentialist critiques of Cartesianism

İlham Dilman

Macmillan , Barnes & Noble, 1993

  • : uk
  • : us

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注記

"This book is published in the Swansea studies in philosophy series."-T.p. verso

Includes bibliographical references and index

内容説明・目次

巻冊次

: uk ISBN 9780333588291

内容説明

This volume discusses existentialist critiques of Cartesian epistemology, the scepticism to which it leads, its objectivist conception of the self, Cartesian dualism and solipsism and the deterministic conception of human life. In sympathy with existentialist thinking, it argues that the reality of both the self and the other, and that of one's body, as one "lives" it, is to be found in what Dilman calls "the personal dimension". The book features a comparison of the critiques of Heidegger and Wittgenstein, and consideration of Sartre's theory of emotions and account of human reality. Ilham Dilman is also the author of "Morality and the Inner Life: A Study of Plato's 'Gorgias'", "Quine on Ontology: Necessity and Experience", "A Trilogy on Freud: Freud and Human Nature", "Freud and the Mind", "Freud, Insight and Change", "Mind, Brain and Behaviour", "Philosophy and the Philosophic Life: A Study in Plato's 'Phaedo'", and "Love and Human Separateness".

目次

  • Man in the world
  • man's way of being - existential dualism
  • the personal dimension - emotions and value judgements
  • Sartre and our identity as individuals
  • mind and body - rejection of Cartesian dualism
  • Sartre on the self and the other - rejection of Cartesian solipsism
  • human separateness and the possibility of communion - Marcel's rejection of Sartrean solipsism
  • Sartre - freedom as something to which man is condemned
  • self, self-knowledge and self-change.
巻冊次

: us ISBN 9780389210047

内容説明

This book is a discussion of Heidegger's, Sartre's and Marcel's rejection of Cartesian epistemology, the scepticism to which it leads and its objectivist conception of human existence. It compares this rejection with Wittgenstein's rejection of these conceptions of man, his relation to the knowledge of what belongs to the world in which he lives. It concentrates on the existentialist critiques of consciousness as a substance and of the self as such a substance, of each person's body as something external to which he is causally related, and of others as at best indirectly accessible to us. It discusses Sartre's positive views on these questions and the way he falls into a form of solipsism himself. It then considers Sartre's rejection of determinism and his conception of freedom as our capacity for choice. In a concluding chapter the book sketches a non-objectivist account of the self, its development, its 'bad faith', its capacity to emerge from it, and its knowledge of itself, free from the objections considered earlier. It then considers some new objections directed at its own account. Contents: Man in the World; Man's Way of Being: Existential Dualism; The Personal Dimension: Emotions and Value Judgements; Sartre and our Identity as Individuals; Mind and Body: Rejection of Cartesian Dualism; Sartre on the Self and the Other: Rejection of Cartesian Solipsism; Human Separateness and the Possibility of Communion: Marcel's Rejection of Sartrean Solipsism; Sartre: Freedom as Something to which Man is Condemned; Self, Self-Knowledge and Self-Change: A Non-Objectivist View and its Defense.

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