The medieval village economy : a study of the Pareto mapping in general equilibrium models
著者
書誌事項
The medieval village economy : a study of the Pareto mapping in general equilibrium models
(Frontiers of economic research)
Princeton University Press, c1993
大学図書館所蔵 全33件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
  茨城
  栃木
  群馬
  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
  ベルギー
  オランダ
  スウェーデン
  ノルウェー
  アメリカ
注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. [137]-139) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Robert Townsend has made path-breaking contributions to contract theory and general equilibrium analysis. In this book, he combines the theory of general economic equilibrium with the notion that allocations and institutions of a given economy might be Pareto optimal to try to explain various salient features of the medieval village economy. The medieval village economy in many ways reflects the economies of poor high-risk agrarian villages of the contemporary world and serves as an ideal testing ground for Townsend's theories. The environment of the medieval village resembles those of relatively simple models with such key elements as uncertainty and private information, and its institutions display distinctive features such as fragmented landholding patterns. In this book standard models of macroeconomics and the literature on contract theory and mechanism design are reinterpreted, applied, and extended. The author draws both descriptive institutional material and particular parameter values from historical observations, and characterizes solutions to the models analytically and numerically.
The idea is to see whether the observed outcomes can be explained, shedding light both on the historical material and the models themselves.
目次
List of FiguresList of TablesPrefaceAcknowledgmentsCh. 1Introduction11.1Motivation and Outline1.2Historical BackgroundCh. 2Uncertainty and Landholding Patterns202.1Statistics on Crop Yields2.2Risk-Allocation in an Arrow-Debreu Model with Cross-Household Diversity2.3Division of Land Types as an Ex Ante Solution to the Risk-Allocation Problem2.4Spatial Division as an Ex Ante Solution with Costs of Fragmentation2.5Multiple Crops and the Diet2.6Risk Allocation with Multiple Goods and Preferences Aggregation over Diverse Households2.7Multiple Goods and the Land-Crop Allocation ProblemCh. 3Storage as Risk Reduction613.1Some Striking observations on Carryover3.2The Neoclassical Growth-Stabilization Model with Dual Storage Possibilities3.3The Representativeness of Carryover Observations in Models with Internal Diversity3.4The Adequacy of Storage as a Self-Insurance Device3.5Carryover with Starvation: An Alternative Theory with Nonconvex, Nonseparable PreferencesCh. 4Labor Arrangements744.1Some Observations on Disparate Landholdings and Labor Arrangements4.2Consumption-Labor Allocations with Crop Production and Utility from Leisure4.3Implications of Consumption-Labor Theory for Observed and Unobserved ArrangementsCh. 5Rentals width Unobserved Outputs865.1Monastic Payments5.2Risk Sharing with Private Information on Crop Output5.3Optimal Multiperiod Tie-Ins5.4Costly State VerificationCh. 6Sharecropping with Unobserved Inputs976.1Share Rents among and within Villas6.2The Moral Hazard Problem and the Nature of Optimial Sharing Rules6.3The Gain from Randomization6.4Efficient Intertemporal Tie-Ins6.5Optimal Cross-Household Tie-Ins6.6Economywide Reporting SystemsCh. 7An Incentive Theory of Landholdings1207.1The Importance of Idiosyncratic Shocks7.2A Numerical Example of Information-Constrained Landholdings7.3Incentive Schemes with Costly Monitoring of Labor Effort7.4Landholdings with Indivisible and Privately Held OxenCh. 8Conclusion133References137Index141
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