Monetary policy and politics : rules versus discretion

著者

• Macesich, George

書誌事項

Monetary policy and politics : rules versus discretion

George Macesich

Praeger, 1992

注記

Includes bibliographical references (p. [139]-151) and index

内容説明・目次

内容説明

Macesich's latest book argues that the poor performance of monetary policy can be attributed to the ease with which money slips into the political arena to become a singularly important political issue. Discretionary authority facilitates monetary manipulation for political ends, thereby increasing uncertainty and casting doubt on money, the monetary system, and indeed the monetary authority itself. The author traces the evolution of the debate over rules versus discretionary authority and discusses various methods that economists have proposed for constrain the monetary authority. If monetary policy is to be credible and thus successful, the hands of monetary policy makers are better tied than left free. This work by a noted authority on monetary theory and policy will interest economists in academia and the policy-making community.

目次

Depoliticizing Monetary Policy Can Economists and Economic Science Help? Policy Rules or Discretionary Authority? Limits to Discretion: The Specie (Gold) Standard, Private Money, and a Monetary Constitution The Classical Gold (Specie) Standard: Managed Fiduciary Standard and Economic Performance since 1834 Central Banking and Bureaucracy Collapse of a Rules-Oriented Monetary Reserve: The Interwar Experience Casting Adrift the Price Level? Bibliography Index

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詳細情報

• NII書誌ID(NCID): BA20838298
• ISBN:
  • 0275943356
• LCCN: 92003379
• 出版国コード: us
• タイトル言語コード: eng
• 本文言語コード: eng
• 出版地: Westport, Conn.
• ページ数/冊数: 161 p.
• 大きさ: 22 cm
• 分類:
  • LCC : HG230.3
  • DC20 : 332.4/6
• 件名:
  • LCSH : Monetary policy