Foundations of rational choice under risk
著者
書誌事項
Foundations of rational choice under risk
Clarendon Press , Oxford University Press, 1993
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注記
Bibliography: p. [141]-155
Includes index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
The author describes and evaluates a number of existing criticisms of the formal theory of rationality and subjective expected utility theory. The latter rests on axioms that are usually regarded as principles of rationality; that is, principles that a rational person would never want to violate. The author claims that these axioms cannot be shown to be principles of rationality in this sense and provides his own axiomatic alternative account of rational choice. He finds that rationality is not a behavioural entity, but rather has to do with the relation between an agent's preferences and his or her behaviour. The book rejuvenates the old risk uncertainty distinction and draws together many of the critiques of the standard axioms such as transitivity and independence.
目次
- Utility theory
- experimental evidence for rational choice
- theory aims and evaluation
- in praise of intransitive preference
- independence
- completeness an dcontinuity
- interpreting axiomatic decision theory
- uncertainty and a new axiomatic theory of rational choosing.
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