The politics of miscalculation in the Middle East
著者
書誌事項
The politics of miscalculation in the Middle East
（Indiana series in Arab and Islamic studies）
Indiana University Press, c1993
- : alk. paper
- : pbk. : alk. paper
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注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. [263]-269) and index
内容説明・目次
- 巻冊次
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: pbk. : alk. paper ISBN 9780253207814
内容説明
Why do international crises seem to occur so often in the Middle East? Former U.S. diplomat Richard B. Parker presents three detailed studies of policy failures that he believes were precipitated by miscalculations on the part of diplomats and of government and military leaders in one or more Middle Eastern countries, the United States, and the former USSR. They are the Soviet-Egyptian miscalculation leading to the June 1967 war between Israel and the Arab states, the U.S.-Israeli miscalculation leading to Soviet military intervention in Egypt in 1970, and the U.S.-Israeli miscalculation leading to the disastrous Lebanese-Israeli peace agreement of May 17, 1983.
Parker's many-sided, often gripping account of the way in which these crises unfolded illustrates how the same events can be viewed very differently by the observers and actors involved, and how political decisions can precipitate reactions that are often very different from those anticipated. Although the book highlights the unavoidably uncertain and contingent element in all diplomatic activity, it also shows that careful attention to history, to past performance, and to prevailing mindsets in the countries involved can be invaluable aids in diplomatic crisis management. The many sources assembled and the careful weighing of their accuracy and reliability, along with the combined perspective of the practitioner and the scholar, make this book an important resource for diplomats, policymakers, and students of diplomacy.
目次
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Part One
The June War
1. The Soviet Warning
2. Moscow's Explanations
3. The Egyptian Recation
4. From Deterrence to Disaster
5. The American Role
Part Two
The War of Attrition
6. War and Nonwar
7. Misjudgment on the Nile
Part Three
The Israel-Lebanon Peace Agreement of 1983
8. The Israeli Invasion of 1982
9. The Negotiations
10. The Final Reckoning
Conclusion
Appendix
Notes
Annotated Bibliography
Index
- 巻冊次
-
: alk. paper ISBN 9780253342980
内容説明
Why do international crises seem to occur so often in the Middle East? Former U.S. diplomat Richard B. Parker presents three detailed studies of policy failures that he believes were precipitated by miscalculations on the part of diplomats and of government and military leaders in one or more Middle Eastern countries, the United States, and the former USSR. They are the Soviet-Egyptian miscalculation leading to the June 1967 war between Israel and the Arab states, the U.S.-Israeli miscalculation leading to Soviet military intervention in Egypt in 1970, and the U.S.-Israeli miscalculation leading to the disastrous Lebanese-Israeli peace agreement of May 17, 1983. Parker's many-sided, often gripping account of the way in which these crises unfolded illustrates how the same events can be viewed very differently by the observers and actors involved, and how political decisions can precipitate reactions that are often very different from those anticipated.
Although the book highlights the unavoidably uncertain and contingent element in all diplomatic activity, it also shows that careful attention to history, to past performance, and to prevailing mindsets in the countries involved can be invaluable aids in diplomatic crisis management. The many sources assembled and the careful weighing of their accuracy and reliability, along with the combined perspective of the practitioner and the scholar, make this book an important resource for diplomats, policymakers, and students of diplomacy.
目次
Acknowledgments Introduction Part One The June War 1. The Soviet Warning 2. MoscowOs Explanations 3. The Egyptian Recation 4. From Deterrence to Disaster 5. The American Role Part Two The War of Attrition 6. War and Nonwar 7. Misjudgment on the Nile Part Three The Israel-Lebanon Peace Agreement of 1983 8. The Israeli Invasion of 1982 9. The Negotiations 10. The Final Reckoning Conclusion Appendix Notes Annotated Bibliography Index
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