Interpretation and explanation in the human sciences
著者
書誌事項
Interpretation and explanation in the human sciences
（SUNY series in the philosophy of the social sciences）
State University of New York Press, c1993
- : hard
- : pbk
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注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. 275-287) and indexes
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Henderson examines the foundations of an analytic social science approach to develop a well-integrated account of the human sciences, focusing on the pivotal notions of interpretation and explanation. The author acknowledges the importance of interpretive understanding in the human sciences, and proposes a methodology that reflects both interpretive practice as well as scientific methodology. He refutes the methodological separatists who hold that the logic of explanation and testing in the human sciences is fundamentally different from that of the natural sciences, and examines in detail the constraints on interpretation. In providing an integrated treatment of these two central issues in social science, Henderson offers a thorough analysis of the adequacy of interpretation and the nature of explanation in the human sciences.
目次
Acknowledgments
1. Interpretation and Explanation: Claims and Concerns
2. Standard Accounts of Interpretation and the Principle of Charity
2.1: Standard Accounts of Interpretation
2.1.1: The Holism of Interpretation
2.1.2: A Fundamental Principle of Charity
2.2: Common Refinements to the Principle of Charity
2.2.1: Modifications Related to Stages of Interpretation
2.2.2: Modifications Related to Types of Error
3. A Better Codification of the Constraints on Interpretation
3.1: The Primacy of the Principle of Explicability: The Central Argument
3.2: Two Concrete Illustrations
3.2.1: The Treatment of Observation Sentences
3.2.2: The Treatment of Truth-Functions
3.3: Elaboration
3.3.1: Empirical Adequacy
3.3.2: Rules of Thumb
3.3.3: Solving the Problem of Irrationality
4. On the Supposed A Priori Status of Minimal Rationality
4.1: The View that Rationality is Constitutive of Intentional States
4.1.1: A Priori Truths and "The Subject" as a Conceptual Matter
4.1.2: Needed Perspective: An Extensional Notion of "The Subject"
4.2: On an Argument from Measurement
4.3: On the Argument from Charity in Interpretation
4.4: Is Minimal Rationality Preponderant Rationality: What is Central to Present Theory?
4.5: Summary and Significance
4.6: Further Reflection on Minimal Rationality: Stich's Concerns
4.6.1: Empirical Versus Conceptual Truths Revisited
4.6.2: Acceptable and Unacceptable Similarity Bases for Interpretation
5. On the Supposed Privileged Place of Rationalizing Explanation
5.1: Preliminaries
5.1.1: The Basic Issue and What Is Sought to Resolve It
5.1.2: The Rudimentary Received Model of Rationalizing Explanation
5.1.3: On Theory-Dependent Versus Transcendent Preferred Statuses
5.2: Rationalizing Explanation in Light of a General Account of Intentional Explanation
5.2.1: Dispositions, Functional Analysis, and Semantic Interpretability
5.2.2: Rationalizing Explanation and Nomic Generalizations
5.2.3: Rationalizing Explanation and Irrationalizing Explanation are Epistemologically on a Par
6. Rationalizing Explanation and the Scientific Explanation of Events
6.1: Restating Our Issue
6.2: Why Explanations are Non-extensional and Why Normative Principles are Explanatorily Impotent
6.3: Applications To International Explanations
7. The Nomic Status of Psychological Generalizations: Handling Rosenberg's Refinability Problem
7.1: Rosenberg's Challenge: Nomicity and Refinability
7.2: An Illustrative Casev
7.3: Bootstrap Testing: Using our Theoretical Resources
8. In Defense of Heteronomic or Soft Laws
8.1: The Issue: Can Psychological Generalizations Be Nomic?
8.2: Davidson's Suggestion That Heteronomic Generalizations Do Not Cite Causal Factors and Thus Cannot Be Nomic
8.3: The Prima Facie Case for There Being Nomic Heteronomic Generalizations Citing Causal Factors
8.4: Psychological Factors Can Be Causally Relevant: The Basic Solution to the Explanatory Exclusion Problem
8.5: Kim's Misstep into Reductionism
9. Summary
Notes
Bibliography
Name Index
Subject Index
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