Problems of coordination in economic activity
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Problems of coordination in economic activity
(Recent economic thought)
Kluwer Academic Publishers, c1994
Available at 38 libraries
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Note
Includes bibliographical references and indexes
Description and Table of Contents
Description
Coordination is extremely important in economic, political, and social life. The concept of economic equilibrium is based on the coordination of producers and consumers in buying and selling. This book reviews the topic of coordination from an economic, theoretical standpoint. The aim of this volume is twofold: first, the book contributes to the ongoing research on the economics of coordination; and second, it disseminates results and encourages interest in the topic. The volume contains original research on coordination including general game-theoretic questions, particular coordination issues within specific fields of economics (i.e. industrial organization, international trade, and macroeconomics), and experimental research.
Table of Contents
- Preface. Part I: Introduction. 1. Introduction and Overview
- J. Friedman. 2. A Review of Refinements, Equilibrium Selection, and Repeated Games
- J. Friedman. 3. Coordination in Games: a Survey
- G. Biglaiser. Part II: General Issues in Coordination. 4. Incorporating Behavioral Assumptions into Game Theory
- M. Rabin. 5. On the Concepts of Strategy and Equilibrium in Discounted Repeated Games
- W. Stanford. 6. The `Folk Theorem' for Repeated Games and Continuous Decision Rules
- J. Friedman, L. Samuelson. 7. Alternative Institutions for Resolving Coordination Problems: Experimental Evidence on Forward Induction and Pre-Paly Communication
- R. Cooper, D. DeJong, R. Forsythe, T. Ross. Part III: Coordination in Specific Economic Contexts. 8. The Dynamics of Bandwagons
- J. Farrell, C. Shapiro. 9. Dynamic Tariff Games with Imperfect Observability
- A. Blume, R. Riezman. 10. Coordination Theory, the Stag Hunt and Macroeconomics
- J. Bryant. Index.
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