Who adjusts? : domestic sources of foreign economic policy during the interwar years
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Who adjusts? : domestic sources of foreign economic policy during the interwar years
(Princeton studies in international history and politics)
Princeton University Press, c1994
- : hbk
- : pbk
Available at 43 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
  Norway
  United States of America
Note
Bibliography: p. [305]-318
Includes index
Description and Table of Contents
- Volume
-
: pbk ISBN 9780691017105
Description
In this work Beth Simmons presents a fresh view of why governments decided to abide by or defect from the gold standard during the 1920s and 1930s. Previous studies of the spread of the Great Depression have emphasized "tit-for-tat" currency and tariff manipulation and a subsequent cycle of destructive competition. Simmons, on the other hand, analyzes the influence of domestic politics on national responses to the international economy. In so doing, she powerfully confirms that different political regimes choose different economic adjustment strategies.
Table of Contents
List of FiguresList of TablesAcknowledgmentsCh. 1Introduction3The Problem: Explaining International Economic Relations during the Interwar Years4The Argument of This Book11Toward an Explanation of the Policy Mix: Methodology and Organization13Findings18Ch. 2The Interwar Gold Standard20The Prewar and Interwar Gold Standards20The Norms of Gold Standard Adjustment31Explaining Policy Choice during the Interwar Years42Ch. 3The Determinants of External Imbalance52Politics, Credibility, and External Imbalance52Capital Movements64The Current Account84Ch. 4Devaluation106Descriptive Statistics: Currency Depreciation107On Gold or Off?112Explaining Currency Depreciation118Domestic Politics and Currency Depreciation: The Evidence125Cumulative Results138Ch. 5France, 1924-1927140The Real Economy145Cracks in Credibility149From a Crack to a Gulf, January 1925-July 1926156The Politics of Credibility164Ch. 6Tariff Protection174Descriptive Statistics of Tariff Protection175Explaining Tariff Levels178Changes in Tariff Policy191Cumulative Results214Ch. 7Deficits during Depression: Britain, Belgium, and France in the Thirties219Aggregate Introduction to the Cases and to the Policy Mix223The Case of Britain, 1929-1931226The Case of Belgium, 1934-1936241The Case of France, 1935-1937256Ch. 8Conclusions275The Argument276Major Findings278Implications for International Cooperation282Implications for International Political Economy283Parting Words286Appendix I. General Data Appendix289Appendix II. Central Bank Independence Data299Select Bibliography305Index319
- Volume
-
: hbk ISBN 9780691086415
Description
This study presents a fresh view of why governments decided to abide by or defect from the gold standard during the 1920s and 1930s. Previous studies of the spread of the Great Depression have emphasized "tit-for-tat" currency and tariff manipulation and a subsequent cycle of destructive competition. This work, on the other hand, analyzes the influence of domestic politics on national responses to the international economy. In so doing, it confirms that different political regimes chose different economic adjustment strategies. Using cross-sectional time series data and four cases studies, it offers a profile of the domestic politics and institutions associated with capital flight, current account deficit, currency devaluation, and tariff protection - all of which were inconsistent with the demands of remaining on the gold standard. The work demonstrates that capital flight and current account deficits stemmed largely from governmental failure to develop credible anti-inflationary policies. In turn, decisions to externalize the subsequent deficits, whether through high tariffs or devaluation, were also driven by domestic political conditions.
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