Two-person bargaining experiments with incomplete information
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書誌事項
Two-person bargaining experiments with incomplete information
（Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems, 412）
Springer-Verlag, c1994
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2-person bargaining experiments with incomplete information
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注記
Includes bibliographical references
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Think of the following situation: A project yielding a gross profit of 100 is offered to two firms. The project can only be conducted by a cooperation of the two firms. No firm is able to conduct the project alone. In order to receive the project the firms have to agree on the allocation of the gross profit. Each of both firms has an alternative project it conducts in case the joint project is not realized. The profitability of an allocation of the joint gross profit for a firm depends on the gross profit from its alternative project. The gross profit from an alternative project can be either 0 (low alternative value) or O
目次
1. Introduction.- I: The Game Theoretic Analysis.- 2. Two-Person Bargaining with Incomplete Information.- 2.1 The Two-Person Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information.- 2.2 Two-Person Bargaining Models with Incomplete Information.- 3. The Nash Equilibria in Pure Strategies.- 3.1 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions.- 3.2 The Case of No Discounting.- 3.3 The Expected Equilibrium Payoffs.- II: The Game Playing Experiment.- 4. Related Bargaining Experiments.- 4.1 Two-Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information.- 4.2 Fairness in Bargaining.- 5. The Experimental Design.- 5.1 Technical Conditions.- 5.2 The Experimental Design.- 5.3 Notes on the Evaluation of the Experiment.- 6. The Agreement Outcomes.- 6.1 Hypotheses on the Agreement Outcomes.- 6.2 The Agreement Outcomes.- 6.3 The Prominence Level.- 6.4 Verification of the Hypotheses.- 6.5 Asymmetry in the Agreement Outcomes of two Weak Players.- 6.6 Descriptive Theories of the Agreement Outcomes.- 6.7 Average Payoff and Expected Payoff in Equilibrium.- 7. Break Offs.- 7.1 Conflict Frequencies.- 7.2 Break Offs by the Weak Player.- 7.3 Break Offs by the Strong Player.- 7.4 Immediate Break Offs.- 7.5 Agreements under similar Circumstances.- 8, Further Aspects.- 8.1 The Initial Demands.- 8.2 Length of Bargaining.- 8.3 Incentive Compatibility.- 8.4 Revelation by the Weak Player.- 8.5 Altruism.- 9. The Bargaining Process.- 9.1 Models of the Bargaining Process.- 9.2 The Concession Behavior in the Bargaining Process.- 9.3 The Bargaining Process in Games with ?.- 10. Individual Adaptation to Experience.- 10.1 Qualitative Description of the Adaptation.- 10.2 Quantitative Aspects of the Adaptation.- 11. A Picture of the Subjects' Behavior.- 11.1 Stylized Facts.- 11.2 A Qualitative Picture of Subjects' Behavior.- III: The Strategy Experiment.- 12. The Strategy Experiment.- 12.1 Organization of the Strategy Experiment.- 12.2 Results of the Game Playing Sessions.- 12.3 Results of the Group Tournaments.- 12.4 Results of the Final Tournament.- 13. Typicalness of the Final Strategies.- 13.1 Measuring the Typicalness of Behavior.- 13.2 Notes on the Evaluation of the Typicalness.- 13.3 Typicalness of the Final Strategy for ?=30.- 13.4 Typicalness of the Final Strategy for ?=45.- 13.5 Typicalness of the Final Strategy for ?=60.- 13.6 A Picture of the Typical Strategy.- 14. An Evolutionary Tournament.- 14.1 The Evolutionary Approach.- 14.2 Results of the Evolutionary Tournament.- 14.3 Fitness and Typicity.- 15. Summary and Conclusions.- Appendix A. Instructions of the Game Playing Experiment.- Appendix B. Statistical Tests.- References.
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